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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the characteristics of terrorism in the
new international environment following the Cold War in which in­
ternational terrorism is undergoing drastic changes in its sources 
and characteristics.
The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffusion 
of political power have given way to rivalry between regional sta­
tes; especially, one of the key factors is the effect of weapons 
proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals 
including nuclear, biological, and chemical-weapons capability.
The world is also confronting an assortment of prodemocracy and
anti-colonial movements which tend to erupt in civil disorder.
The above ingredients are currently fomenting the new environment 
for terrorism.
This thesis first looks at the nature of terrorism and exam­
ines the background to the issue; it then assesses how the inter­
national environments characterizes the new trend of terrorism 
that necessitates international cooperation to cope with it.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ........................................................ iii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ......................................  1
CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM
A. Complexity of Defining of Terrorism................... 12
B. Working Definition ....................................  13
C. Isolating Characteristics of Terrorism................. 18
D. Distinguishing from Similar Political Violence .....  20
E. Typology of Terrorism by Perpetrator ................  21
F. Roots, Justification, Source, and Media .............  29
CHAPTER III: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
AND ITS SOURCE OF TERRORISM
A. Shifting Political Landscape .......................  36
B. Forces that destabilize the World Security ......... 39
CHAPTER IV: CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-COLD WAR TERRORISM
A. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instrument of Foreign 
P o l i c y ...................................................51
B. The Characteristics of Dissident Terrorism.......... 64
C. Establishment (State) Terrorism.......................  73





A. Discussion of Current Settings of Terrorism
International terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon on the world 
stage, although the use of terror has been around since biblical times. 
And definition of terms relating to terrorism is constantly changing, 
depending on which side of the ideological divide they are viewed. Some 
older terms have been discarded and some new ones have become part of 
our language. However, there is no denying that international terrorism 
is inevitably conditioned by the existing international environment; and 
it is one of the byproducts from distortion of world politics. The new 
world order brought by the post Cold War situation, is also destined to 
entail substantial influences upon the resources and of current 
terrorism.
l. The End of Cold War Era
Since the end of World War II, international politics has been 
dominated by the political and military confrontation between the United 
States and Soviet Union. That competition, known generally as the Cold 
War, developed with the restructuring of the international system.
In the post World War II climate, the major concern was whether the 
two major powers could maintain the wartime collaboration. If they 
could, the United Nations Charter provided a vehicle for them to
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organize peace around the principle of collective security (Chapter VII 
of the Charter). If the major powers could not maintain the war time 
collaboration or competition, the Charter allowed them to form a 
competitive alliance through Article 51, which provided for the 
individual and collective self-defense of the members.
What would not determine collaboration or competition was whether 
the two major powers could agree on a mutually acceptable world order 
that could be enforced. They could not. America's world of liberal demo­
cracies conflicted with Stalin's world of socialism and communism. The 
result was the Cold War international system, in which the competition 
between communism and anti-communism became the central international 
concern. It took several years for the collaboration to break down and 
for the competition to emerge. Collaboration was dead by 1947, though 
the hardened rules of Cold War competition were not firmly in place 
until June 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.
Under the Cold War international system, it was widely believed in 
Western society that the financial and psychological support by Eastern 
bloc countries was a major Btimulant of the anti-American terrorist mo­
vements in the 1970s and 1980s. Libya, Syria, and Cuba, were the three 
countries most heavily linked to anti-western terrorism around the 
world. This Cold War view shows that terrorism has become an attractive 
strategy for the actors in international politics, preferable to 
conventional or nuclear warfare, which has become too risky and too 
expensive. Its use by hostile states gives terrorism the potential to 
alter the international balance of power.1
The Cold War system now lies shattered. The most dramatic symbols 
of its end include the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the
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destruction of Berlin Wall, and ultimately, the demise of the Soviet 
Union. Two major sets of dynamics came together to make the end of the 
Cold War inevitable: First, the East-West military paralysis that was 
caused largely by nuclear weapons; huge nuclear arsenals make nuclear 
war inconceivable not only between countries that possess them, but also 
because they can destroy societies worldwide. Any war between the 
superpowers has the potential of becoming nuclear war and so has to be 
avoided. It was precisely nuclear parity, the existence of nuclear 
weapons on both sides, that has preserved the peace. Nuclear paralysis, 
thereby, deters both nuclear and conventional military confrontations.
On the other hand, military competition between the superpowers became 
expensive. Defense expenditures, many of which were devoted to East-West 
matters, consumed twenty five percent of the Soviet GNP in the late 
1980s.2 Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates reached the need to end the 
competition, particularly considering the troubled economical times in 
the Soviet Union.
Another major factor tied to the inevitable end of the Cold War was 
the economical revolution of the 1980s, a phenomenon with opposite pulls 
and effects. On one hand, the economies of the West experienced 
unprecedented growth and prosperity during this time; on the other hand, 
the economies of the countries of the Eastern Bloc specially in the 
Soviet Union, failed to expand during the 1980s. The reasons for the 
extraordinary growth in the West are complex, but three factors did play 
important roles: the high technology revolution; internationalization of 
economical activities; global privatization of the international 
economy.3
Soviet socialism was failing. The Stalinist command economy, which 
had been the envy of the world in the 1930s, was declining. In addition, 
the Soviets were excluded from the high technology revolution that might 
have stimulated their economy. The reason for their exclusion was that 
most of the technologies were "dual use," with both civilian and 
military threats, so the technologies were not shared with them. Thus, 
the Soviet economy and economies of Eastern European countries declined 
as the West grew. The gap became more obvious as the Western media 
penetrated the East. The Cold War ended because Gorbachev knew his 
country could not win the confrontation militarily, and because he 
realized the hollow competition had become ruinously expensive. In 
short, a military stalemate and economic necessity combined to produce 
the end of the Cold War, the political and military division of Europe, 
and the "enslaveement" of Eastern Europe.4
What are the post Cold War changes in the perspective of internat­
ional terrorism? Russia becomes a more normal state within the 
international system. The first and most obvious change from this point 
of view were changes in foreign policy, especially toward the Third 
World. Before the rise of the new Russia, competing for influence with 
the United States in the Third World was an important part of Soviet 
policy—  a means for promoting communism and reinforcing Soviet power 
worldwide without significantly raising the specter of military conflict 
between the super powers (state sponsorship of terrorism as a tool of 
foreign policy). New foreign policy renounced the Brezhinev doctrine, 
which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of 
beleaguered Socialist movements worldwide. It was replaced by the
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which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of 
beleaguered Socialist movements worldwide. It was replaced by the 
assertion that the sovereignty right of nations should be honored 
without interference. One result was to reduce the competition between 
the East and West in Third World countries. Russia's motivation appeared 
to be twofold. On the one hand, the competition was usually costly and 
the benefits of it short-lived; on the other hand. East West competition 
in the Third World was just another irritant in overall relations in the 
face of a need to reduce tension in order to gain access to Western 
assistance.5
B. Regionalism
The new Security environment after the Cold War is currently 
fomenting a new trend of international terrorism, even though it is 
somewhat risky to attempt to isolate such characteristics, because the 
world is still undergoing transformation.
- The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffu­
sion of political power has resulted in rivalry between regional states, 
especially in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Of particular 
concern is the ongoing rivalry between China and Taiwan, South Korea and 
North Korea, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
Israel and Syria. These have all flared up periodically in the past but 
they seem to have gained intensity in recent years as the inhibiting 
influence of the superpowers declined and regional power equations 
became more unsettled. Several countries would experience a fresh out­
break of fighting in the latter 1990s.
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proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals. 
Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities are now possessed 
by numerous regional states, some of which have or are developing ball­
istic means of delivery. This could invite a preemptive strike by a riv­
al. Such strikes have taken place before (1981 Israel's attack on Iraq's 
Ossirak reactor).
- The world is confronted with an assortment of prodemocr­
acy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically in st­
rikes or civil disorders(source of dissident terrorism)/ or provoke vi­
olence by the authorities(source of state or establishment terrorism). 
They include: popular drive for Western style electoral democracy and 
human rights, as have been working themselves out in Burma, China, Hai­
ti, and the Philippines; struggles by disenfranchised minorities and 
majorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments 
from Northern Ireland to the former South Africa; and efforts by subject 
people to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule in the West Bank and 
Gaza.
C. The Purpose of Thesis
This paper is to examine the difference of characteristics in the 
post-Cold War international environment from that of Cold War era.
It will first examine the nature of terrorism and the background to the 
issue. Unfortunately, universally accepted definitions of terrorism do 
not exist for the reasons that we will examine later. It is analyzed in 
a wide perspective to help understand the implications in terms of roots 
and causes; political and working level implications; academic freezing 
of its characteristics; and other sociological background including its
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relationship with media.
Also analyzed in Chapter III, are the new international environment 
and its source of terrorism. In this Chapter, I will first briefly touch 
on the new shifting political landscape in the post Cold War situation, 
and then introduce six forces that destabilize the world's security. The 
forces are: the pull of economic forces; the global diffusion of power; 
increased popular assertiveness at grass-roots level; the diminishing 
power and authority of nation-state; the rise of the "weapon" with new 
capability, and population growth and environmental decline.
This work then looks into the characteristics of post Cold War 
terrorism in Chapter IV: it assesses how a new international environment 
produced by the break-down of the bipolar system and concomitant 
diffusion of political power, has given the impetus and characterized 
the new trend of terrorism. First, it analyzes the elements which 
qualify international or transnational terrorism and the mechanism of 
contemporary state support terrorism, then proceeds to elaborate the 
process of changes from polarized manipulation of terrorism by two 
superpowers as an instrument of foreign policy to joint anti-terrorist 
efforts in global scale cooperating and sharing responsibility.
Second, it looks into the characteristics of current dissident 
terrorism that are categorized into nationalist and revolutionist 
terrorism It covers the world decomposing empire and superstates 
(dissolution of Soviet Russia) as model cases of nationalist terrorism 
(ethno-nationalism in war), and makes a case study in Bosnian affairs. 
Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism has largely dissipated, 
revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an attraction
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for dispossessed people. As regards revolutionist terrorism, this paper 
discusses two main types of revolutionary crusade at present: 
ideological or political movements attempting to end exploitation of the 
poor by the rich; and religious fundamentalism, a drive to subject all 
social interaction to religious law and practice.
Third, since the use of terrorist violence and repression by states 
against their own citizens is a common phenomenon, even in post Cold War 
era, establishment(state) terrorism is covered in some depth: in terms 
of the relationship of state to society; characteristics of state 
terrorism; and conditions associated with the emergence of terrorism. 
And, a case study is made of "Iraqi State Terrorism to the Kurdish 
Minority.”
Terrorism can be reduced but not eradicated, because however 
democratic a society, however near to perfection the social institution, 
there will be always alienated and disaffected people, some of whom will 
be aggressive and more interested in violence than in freedom and 
tolerance (the source of terrorism). The reaction to the terrorist, 
therefore, could not be ignored because fortunes of terrorism depend 
largely on the response it encounters both from the public and the 
authorities. In the post Cold War era, there exists no distinctive 
leader in world community. This situation inevitably requires 
international cooperation among responsible nations to cope with 




Since 1945, political violence literature, including terrorism, has 
evolved seemingly to keep pace with events, and has grown enormously 
during the last two decades. The problem with literature about terrorism 
is how accurate is the literature of the secret struggle and how much of 
it can we believe? The problem is compounded by an actual disinformation 
game being played on the reader in many instances by various secret 
agencies and legislatures around the world. In the past, the literature 
appearing in the media of communist and certain leftist countries has 
been so filled with ideology, propaganda, and inaccuracy that it remains 
virtually impossible to unravel the truth from the lie.
In the United States, the literature has fluctuated according to 
time and purpose. The most accurate journal, the CIA's quarterly Studies 
In Intelligence, is classified and not available to the public. The 
other, Covert Action Information Bulletin, while not classified, is 
extremely difficult to obtain by the layperson.6
Professor Harry Howe Ransome in his article "Strategic Intelligence 
and Foreign Policy" suggests that literature about international 
political violence may be classified in three different ways: First, 
there is the "memoir," a publication by former members of the secret war 
establishment. Next there is the "muckraking" product, a whistle blowing 
expose which can often provide certain insight but usually fails the 
standard test of serious scholarship. Finally, there is the "objective 
analysis" a scholarly work prepared by a professional specialist in 
history or another social science, which examine "How the system works 
in specific historical contexts."
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Myron J. Smith Jr., the author of The Secret Wars: A Guide to 
Sources in English advises as a rule of thumb that secret war literature 
must be treated with a certain skepticism, adopt the code of the 
"investigative" journalist, and accept no fact that cannot be verified 
in a at least two or three overt sources.7 This is understandable; if 
everyone knew what is going on and truthfully reported it, the secret 
political violence would not be secret.
As noted earlier, the literature on terrorism has grown enormously 
in the last two decades. Of the existing bibliographies and guide books 
the most recent and comprehensive is Alex P. Schmidt Political Terrorism 
(Amsterdam, 1983; New Burnswick, 1986). The following should also be 
mentioned: Augustus R.Norton and Martin H. Greenberg, International 
Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide (Boulder, Colora­
do, 1980); and Edward Mickolus, The literature of Terrorism(Westport, 
Conn.,1980). Another useful handbook is Peter Janke, Guerrilla and 
Terrorist Organization (New York,1983), Also L. Bonanate, La Violenza 
Politika nel mundo contempolaneo (Milan, 1979; M.J. Smith Jr. The 
Secret
Wars, vol, III: Terrorism 1960-1980 (Santababara, 1980). Unfortunately 
there is no truly international guide in this respect. The Quarterly 
Terrorism has published over the years many articles, documents and 
reports on conferences. Documents concerning the history of terrorism 
can be found in the Terrorism Reader (New York, 1978: new revised edn 
1987), edited by the present writer.8
The books I have referred to, other than those listed in reparation 
of this work, are attached in a separate bibliography.
XI
1 Crenshaw, Martha. 1989,10, Terrorism and International Cooperation,
New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies.
2 Snow,Donald M. 1992,6, Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and New 




6 Smith, Myron J. Jr. 1980, 15-18, The Secret War: A guide to Sources in 
English. Volume 1, Santa Barbara, Ca.: Center for the Study of Armament 
and Disarmament, U.C.L.A.
7 Smith Jr.,20.
8 Laqueur, Walter,1987,323-24, Age of Terrorism, Toranto & Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company.
CHAPTER II
THE ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM
A. Complexity of Defining of Terrorism
The Term "Terrorism" and "terrorist," are of a relatively recent 
date: the meaning of terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the 
Dictionnaire of the academic FranCaise as 'system regime de la terreur.' 
^Terror' originally referred to a period characterized by political exe­
cution, as during the French Revolution from May 1793 to July 1794. All 
together at least 300.000 people were arrested during the Reign of Ter­
ror and 17,000 were officially tried and executed, while many died in 
prison or without a trial.
The distinctive phenomena of our time, labeled as "terrorism," 
and "political violence" are steadily magnifying their intensity in re­
cent years. Yet there is no universally or even generally accepted con­
ception 2 of what entails "terrorism" and "terrorist activities" where 
"political violence" by individuals and groups, or a sovereign states 
against its people, or one state or international entity against an­
other, begins and ends. The author of a recent research guide to the 
concepts, Theory and Literature on Political Terrorism has collected 109
12
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different definitions provided by various writers between 1936 and 1981. 
There is every reason to assume that there have been more since. 2 *
Most authors agree that terrorism is the use or the threat of the 
use of violence, a method of combat, or strategy to achieve a certain 
targets that it aims to induce a state of fear in the victims, that it 
is ruthless and does not confirm with humanitarian rules, and that pub­
licity is ah essential factor in the terrorist strategy. However, beyond 
these points definitions diverge, since high political stakes inevitably 
mean that many definitions are formulated to serve particular political 
agenda.
Former Senator Jermiah Denton, in his introduction to the Anti- 
Terrorist Act of 1984, provides an example of the Western type defini­
tion:
Terrorism means the knowing use of force or violence against 
any person or property in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or any state, territory, possession, or district, 
with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence a government or 
person in furtherance of any political or ideological objective. 3
Some nonaligned nations, with the following definition, clearly 
seek to reclassify in favor of liberation movements, the form of coer­
cion considered "terrorist." Terrorism for them, consists of :
Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, rac­
ist, .■ and alien regimes against people struggling for their libera­
tion . .
tolerating or assisting by a state or organization.4
B. Working Definition
These statistics come from InTer 85: A Review of International Terror­
ism in 1985, and similarly for 1986 and 1987, published by the Jerusalem 
Post and Jaffee Center for Strategy of Tel Aviv University.
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All specific definitions of terrorism have their shortcomings sim­
ply because reality is always richer or more complicated than any gener­
alization. Unlike some chemical elements, there is no such a thing as 
pure, unalloyed, unchanging terrorism, but there are many forms of ter­
rorism.
Even though a comprehensive, generally accepted definition of ter­
rorism does not exist and is unlikely to come into existence, a working 
definition is certainly not beyond our reach: in any case, political de­
cision makers will not wait for a consensus to emerge among political 
scientists before they take the measures they deem necessary to combat 
terrorism. Physicians use many drugs, even though their exact physio­
logical effects remain a mystery. What applies to medicine should be 
acceptable in the study of terrorism.
According to the definition of a US task force in the 1960s,ter­
rorists engage in a "certain type of criminal activity."
Subsequent definitions by various branches of US Government were 
slightly more cautious, but they all mention the "specific use of 
force" (Department of Defense, States and Justice, and the FBI). This is 
certainly true inasmuch as —  terrorism violates both international and 
domestic laws. The application of the lethal norm is of little help in 
establishing the political character of a terrorist movement; plotters 
against Hitler also tried to use forces unlawfully, and the same is true 
of the rebels in Afghanistan and many other such groups. A 1983 Depart-
See U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standard, 
and Goals, Report of Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism (Washington 
DC.,1976). Also see FBI Terrorist Research and Analyst Center, Terror­




ment of Defense definition emphasizes the use of force or violence by a
"revolutionary organization," and the State Department mentioned in 1984
"Noncombatant targets." Both were controversial statements. The vice- 
president's Task Force on combating terrorism (Bush Committee, 1986) 
used a definition that is the mixture of those previously used by other 
government departments. It reads as follows: "unlawful use or threat of 
violence against persons or property to further political or social ob­
jectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, 
individuals, or groups, or to modify their behavior or politics."5
'Terrorism,' of course, is in contravention of the laws of the land and
of international law, but application of legal norms presents certain 
difficulties, legitimate resistance (legitimate according to natural 
law) against tyrants is also criminal if seen in this light.
Unlike some chemical elements, there is no such a thing as pure, 
unalloyed, unchanging terrorism, but there are many forms of terrorism. 
In some circumstances, a case can be made for broader and, of necessity, 
vague definitions, such as the one that appears in British Prevention of 
Terrorist Act of 1974. This Act states that, for the purpose of legisla­
tion, terrorism is the "use of violence for political ends, and includes 
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section 
of the public in fear." For instance, mass violence in the form of a 
riot, violent demonstrations, street battles or civil war.
A working definition of terrorism also has to be examined in the 
global level of perspective. Although the international community ap­
pears to recognize the need for cooperation against terrorism, national 
interests have dominated the treatment of the issue and unanimity has
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been rhetorical rather than practical. The issue of opposition terrorism 
appeared on the international agenda of the post-World War Il-world only 
in 1972, as a result of the attack by the Black September organization 
on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. An American initiative 
(The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts 
of International Terrorism) was rejected. Subsequent efforts to draw up 
a treaty to submit to the General Assembly foundered on the issue of de­
fining terrorism, which split Third World and Western states. Their dif­
ferences centered on the issues of whether terrorism can be considered 
in isolation from the causes, which the Third World conceived to be ra­
cism and colonialism. The Third World insisted that state "terrorism" or 
oppression was the real priority.
However, as oppositional terrorism came to threaten more and more 
states; a body of international laws developed in a specific and limited 
area. Its approach was not to make "terrorism" a crime, given the 
imprecision and ambiguity of the term, but to outlaw the specific 
actions that are the components of terrorist strategies, such as hijack­
ings or attacks on diplomatic agents. In 1973, the Convention on Preven­
tion and Punishment of crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including diplomatic agents urged international coordination to prevent 
attacks on diplomats. In 1979, the General Assembly adopted interna­
tional convention on Prevention Against Taking of Hostage. Finally, in 
December 1905, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning ter­
rorism regardless of occasion or cause.
Since Gorbachev's accession to power, the former Soviet Union has 
expressed a new and specific interest in reducing international terror­
17
ism. In his speech to the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1987, Gorbachev 
proposed that the development of effective ways of combating interna­
tional terrorism be made part of a comprehensive international system. 
These changes seemed more than rhetorical. Soviet policy toward the 
Third World and national liberation movements appears to be undergoing 
parallel revisions, although the meaning of these changes in thinking 
and behavior is a source of dispute among Western analysts. The agree­
ment on human rights reached by the conference on Security and Coopera­
tion in Europe in January 1989 is proof of the then Soviet and East 
European interest in cooperating with the West against terrorism. The 
agreement, signed by the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and All 
European nations except Albania, contains a provision condemning terror­
ism as unjustifiable under any circumstances.
Implementation of the convention has been inconsistent; however, 
John F. Murphy, expressing a general consensus among American Interna­
tional law specialists, concludes: "The effectiveness of these global 
conventions as anti-terrorist measure is questionable. Even if fully im­
plemented, limited and piecemeal solutions of these conventions would be 
of little use in combating the many manifestations of terrorism." 6
In short, the problem of terrorism is complicated, and what can be 
said without fear of contradiction about a terrorist group in one coun­
try is by no means true for other groups at other times and other socie­
ties. Different countries have different notions about the legitimacy of 
terrorism, which became manifest in various working definitions of ter­
rorism. All these working definitions are of little consequence to aca­
demic attempts of the conception.
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C. Isolating Characteristics of Terrorism.
In defining the concept of terrorism for the purpose of analysis it 
is critical to isolate terrorism from specific political goals; that is, 
all nationalists, revolutionists or far right extremists are not terror­
ist. No particular ideology or religion is responsible for terrorism. 
Terrorism as a mean is logically separable from the ends it purportedly 
serves. This approach has been necessary to the formation of interna­
tional law on the subject, which has focused on the component parts of 
terrorism, such as hijacking or diplomatic kidnapping, in order to treat 
them as crimes as indicated above.
If one accepts that terrorism is a specific and identifiable type 
of political violence, then its attributes must be listed:
First, it is an organized and purposeful activity, not a spontane­
ous reaction to circumstances.
Second, terrorism involves violence perceived as unacceptable by 
society because of its cruelty and unexpectedness. The form of violence 
itself may be horrifying, such as mid-air explosions of airliners or 
kidnapping.
Third, terrorism usually occurs in situations of peace rather than 
war, and comes as a surprise to its victims. A particularly salient 
characteristic of this form of violence is the usual innocence of its 
victims, who are noncombatants, not prepared to defend themselves 
against attack, and only in the most tenuous way, responsible for the 
action of the government that terrorists oppose. The victims of terror­
ism are often those who bear the least offensive intention toward the 
terrorists —  airline passengers, journalists, diplomats, educators, 
business executives and other civilians. Random assaults on civilian
19
populations are not a new form of terrorism; the anarchists and Irish 
nationalists of the nineteenth century threw bombs into crowded restau­
rants or concealed them in subway or train stations. Modern terrorists 
are more likely to choose this tactic rather than the traditional reli­
ance on assassination of heads of state, prominent officials who are now 
well protected. Terrorists prefer easy targets. Yet the technical de­
structiveness of modern terrorism —  the capacity of exploding bombs of 
sufficient force to kill hundreds of people —  appears to coincide with 
a lessening of moral inhibitions about the use of violence. This erosion 
of inhibition may be due in part to the action of states whose brutali­
ties against their own citizens in peace time and the use of strategic 
bombing of cities in war time set an example of disregard for innocent 
lives. Yet somehow, the psychological effects of oppositional terrorism 
are more shocking to world sensibility.
Fourth. Terrorism is also distinguished by secrecy. Its perpetra­
tors are anonymous, their identities deliberately concealed behind fa­
cades of ordinariness or actual masks. Their violence is unexpected and 
frightening not only because it violates conventional expectations of 
behavior, but because their preparations are clandestine. Terrorists are 
not easily recognizable as enemies. Thus terrorists can be considered a 
form of deception.
Fifth. Terrorism is often referred to as the weapon of the weak, 
since it is frequently the resort of small ideological groups that lack 
a mass base. It is often a substitute for the mobilization of large num­
bers of supporters. However, terrorist tactics can accompany large-scale 
national movements. The Algerian FLN was responsible for the 1956-1957 
campaign of bombing of European civilians in Algiers, which together
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with the severely repressive French response constituted the "Battle of 
Algiers."
In turn, elements from the French military And the settled popula­
tion of Algeria formed the terrorist Secret Army Organization to stop 
the movement toward independence. 7
D. Distinguishing from similar political violences
A frequent source of confusion is the lack of precision in termi­
nology. The following example should suffice. When reporting the bomb 
attacks at Rome and Vienna airports on December 28, 1985 by the members 
of the Abu Nidal group, the London Financial Times used on its title 
page the term "terrorist" and "gunmen," whereas on the second page ref­
erence was made to "guerrillas." Terrorism is often confused with guer­
rilla warfare, since both activities involve low level violence (in 
terms of physical destructiveness) by weaker parties in conflicts. Both 
are convenient methods for challenging the power of the state. The rise 
of the concept of "urban guerrilla warfare" in Latin America in the 
1960s further confuses the issue. Difficulties in distinguishing between 
the two are naturally compounded when Third World nationalist or revolu­
tionary movements, with claims to substantial popular support or control 
of territory, use methods that are essentially terrorist. There is a 
tendency to type all users of terrorism as "terrorist organizations," 
as, for example, in the Israeli attitude toward the PLO. However, such a 
label seems to be a misnomer when applied to groups that do not rely ex­
clusively on terrorism, for which in effect terrorism may be a quite pe­
ripheral tactic.
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Another confusing problem is that in civil conflicts, the distinc­
tion between combatants and noncombatants is blurred. Attempts to define 
terrorism are in many ways' efforts to uphold that distinction. If ter­
rorism is to be regarded as unacceptable violence, the rules for what is 
acceptable violence must be established. Guerrilla warfare iB conven­
tionally thought of as violence against military targets, primarily for 
military effect, although it necessarily avoids prolonged engagements 
with a more powerful government force. Its primary objectives are to 
seize territory and control populations, neither of which is a primary 
goal of terrorism. 8
E. Typology of Terrorism by Perpetrator
Terrorism, as it has been emphasized, is a coercive tactic that may 
be used for a variety of purposes by any side in a political contest. 
Dissidents who cannot make their voices heard in the political arena and 
regimes who cannot impose their will with the available formal instru­
ment of rule may indeed succumb to the terrorist temptation. A more ef­
fective understanding of the significance of terrorist tactics must be 
sensitive to wilder contact within which terrorist events occur and how 
they might be integrated into broader political strategies. We must nei­
ther ignore how the norms that encourage radical politics relate to the 
wilder political culture nor underestimate the utility of terrorism to 
regimes.
By keeping these points in mind, we may better grasp the diversity 
of political elements who use terrorist tactiCB. For the purpose of 
classification, we may develop two more broadly construed forms of ter­
rorism -- dissident and establishment. After examining the varieties of
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dissident and establishment terrorism, we are better able to make sense 
of the popular, crosscutting categories of "international" and "state- 
sponsored" terrorism. 9
1. Dissident Terrorism
Dissident groups deviate from, and perhaps attack, the dominant 
system of power and values in a community. No community is blessed with 
complete consensus, but in most political communities certain values 
will be dominant and these will reinforce, by and large, a particular 
distribution of power. Those who believe themselves deprived under such 
a distribution, either because it discriminates against their values or 
power is insufficient to accomplish their aspiration, will come into 
conflict with this dominant order.
Dissident groups may be distinguished and compared according to the 
comprehensiveness and coherence of their political objective -- what we 
might term their ideological agenda. Such a comparison among types of 
dissident movements that may use terrorism is as follows: 10
a. Criminal Terrorism
Criminal groups lack coherent ideological programs and usually sim­
ply pursue their own enrichment, but they do attend to the operation of 
the state, especially when it comes to protecting their activities. One 
disturbing instance of this form of criminal violence is what has come 
to be called "narcoterrorism," especially as it afflicts the South 
American country of Colombia. Narcoterrorism on the scale practiced in 
Colombia was not a "non-political" event -- the very independence of Co­
lombian institution is at stake.11
b. Nihilist Terrorism
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Nihilists possess some systematic political agenda but it is essen­
tially negative, the destruction of the existing order. They devote lit­
tle if any thought to what follows destruction, beyond some vague an­
ticipation that a new and better order will spontaneously arise once the 
structures of the old regime have been dismantled. The ideologue often 
taken to represent the nihilist agenda is the nineteenth century Russian 
anarchist Serge Nechayev. Contemporary examples of undulated nihilism 
are hard to come by, for most of the potential candidates still cling to 
some shred of a positive ideology, whether these involve a vague promise 
of national liberation or social transformation. Despite such ambigui­
ties, some commentators see a rise in the role of nihilist terrorism 
over the past 15 years. Robert Kupperman and Darnel Trent, for example, 
contrast the political ideals of nineteenth-century radicals with those 
they see underlying contemporary terrorism. Commonly offered examples of 
the trend to nihilism include the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (or Red Army Fac­
tion) , particularly active in Germany during the 1970s, the Japanese 
United Red Army, responsible for the death of two dozen victims gunned 
down at the Tel Aviv airport in 1972, and the Abu Nidal Faction among 
the Palestinians.12
c. National Terrorism 
A more direct challenge to the state is raised by those dissidents 
who successfully appeal to the discontents of a significant segment of 
the population under these circumstances, a carefully structured cam­
paign of violence, including terrorist tactics, may help to solidify 
this potential base of support.
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We often speak too easily of the nation-state, entertaining the 
fiction of a coincidence between the political structure (the state) and 
a homogeneous cultural community (the nation). In fact, multi-national 
states, like the Soviet Union, India, or Canada, are common. Some multi­
state nations, such as the former Germany and Korea, also exist. Even in 
those states fortunate enough to possess a widely shared national iden­
tity, communally based political organizations still exert a powerful 
appeal.
Commonly, particularistic communal ideologies advance the claims of 
ethno-cultural groups against the dominant order in the state, although 
in some specially nasty conflicts, racial differences reinforce ethnic 
and cultural divisions. These dissidents do not advocate simple destruc­
tion; rather, they pursue the protection of the integrity and interest 
of the groups whom they claim to represent. Typically, they demand 
greater autonomy and self-determination, ideas, though vague, which 
serve as powerful inducements for political mobilization. Important 
examples of communal groups that have resorted to terrorism in the past 
decade include:
1) The Basque Separatist Movement: The Basque people, 
concentrated in Northwest corner of Spain, have a centuries-old tradi­
tion of relative autonomy from Madrid.
2) The Sikh Separatist Movement: The Sikhs are essen­
tially a religiously based cultural group concentrated in the Punjab 
state in northern India.
3) The Irish Republican Army: one of more resilient po­
litical movements of the twentieth century, the IRA has waged an inter­
mittent campaign against British rule and Protestant dominance in North­
ern Ireland for more than 65 years.
4) The Palestine Liberation Movement: of all the nation­
alist or communal groups resorting to violence, the one most readily as­
sociated with terrorism are various groups claiming to fight for a Pal­
estinian homeland. 13
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These four examples are among the more prominent of the communal 
groups indulging in terrorism, others include the Corsican nationalists 
who attack representatives of the French central government, and the 
Tamir separatists in Sri Lanka, who are demanding their own autonomous 
state on the northern part of the island.
d. Revolutionary Terrorism
Finally, dissident groups may advocate a program of social trans­
formation that transcends the particularistic concern of any substate 
group. The aim is not to secede and alter it. In some cases, the revolu­
tionary vision transcends the boundaries of any one state to encompass 
a larger, perhaps global, community. The original Marxist revolutionary 
idea certainly possessed such ambitions. The comprehensiveness of ideo­
logical principle is a matter of degree, and most contemporary examples 
of revolutionary dissent fail considerably short of universal appeal 
(communist revolution China and Vietnam largely succeeded because of 
their recognition and cooperation of nationalist aspiration).
Perhaps the most potent contemporary case of mixed appeal is that 
of Islamic fundamentalism, combining a rejection of the corrupting in­
fluence of Western culture with the desire to create a just order based 
on the social ethnic embodied in the Koran.14
2. Establishment Terrorism
Coercion is an instrument of power used not only by those who re­
bel, but also by those who rule. The definition of "acceptable" coercion 
in any stable political community will be based in favor of these who
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use it to defend the established distribution of power and value, usu­
ally some limits will be placed who can use it and to what degree it can 
be used. Acts of coercion in violation of these limits but intended to 
defend from some type of threat or subversion may be termed Established 
(or state) Violence.
Establishment terrorism may be a tactic of repression used by both 
a regime and by private citizens acting to emulate some perceived threat 
to the established order. Somewhat analogous to our preceding effort to 
differentiate among dissident groups who use terrorism according to 
their ideological coherence, we may distinguish among different forms of 
establishment terrorism according to the degree these tactics are inte­
grated into the regular operation of the regime; the institutionaliza­
tion of terrorist tactics transforms establishment terrorism from a form 
of "violence" into "force." 15
a. Vigilante Terrorism
Vigilantism may be defined as a form of establishment violence per­
petrated by private citizens (including "off-duty" public officials). 
Like other forms of establishment coercion, "vigilantics" are intended 
to defend and preserve the established order, not destroy it. The famil­
iar forms of vigilantism, displayed throughout American history and 
popular in the media, commonly involve private citizens stepping in and 
attempting to close the gap of inadequate law enforcement, but often 
some members of the establishment may see a threat emerging from groups 
who violate no law but who represent a different racial, cultural, or 
political identity. Vigilante violence against racial, cultural, or po­
litical groups poses perhaps the greatest likelihood of degeneration
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into a type of terrorism. Although "crime control" vigilantism may de­
generate into indiscriminate violence against the most unlikely of sus­
pects, "social group control" vigilantism starts off by targeting those 
who cannot even be loosely described as combatants.16
For an example of this sort, in the rioting that took place after 
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandi in October 1984, over 
1,500 Sikhs across India were murdered, and thousand of others were 
beaten and their property destroyed.
b. Covert Official Terrorism
Vigilante terrorism consists of private citizens using indiscrimi­
nate violence against a perceived threat to the established order; how­
ever, the distinction between "private" and "public" is not clear-cut. 
People perform both private and public roles, and these are not always 
neatly compartmentalized. One of the better known campaigns of covert 
official terrorism was that inflicted on Argentina between 1976 and 
1979. Many of the details have been revealed through the efforts of the 
civilian regime of President Alfonsin, in their efforts to combat a real 
threat from left-wing guerrillas, the military rulers unleashed "dirty 
war" against a wide range of suspects. During this period at least 7,000 
people disappeared, including children and expectant mothers. The war 
was conducted by decentralized and secretive military commands in order 
to make it difficult to establish clear lines of authority and to make 
it difficult to trace the fate of those taken from their homes in the 
middle of night.17
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Those who survived reported that their captors disguised their 
identities. The military, then, did not deny it was engaged in a major 
struggle against enemies of the regime, real or imaged, but the top 
leaders denied particular knowledge of the conduct of the campaign and 
deliberately obscured their responsibility.
c. Overt Regime Terrorism
Some regimes become sufficiently brazen about their terrorist tac­
tics that they embrace them openly as a major enforcement strategy of 
their rule. No longer is it a matter of tolerating vigilante terrorism, 
the blurring of the boundary between private and public enforcement 
roles, or even the deliberate implementation of a covert program of ter­
rorism. In all of these cases, at least some recognition survives that 
establishment terrorism violates the formal rules and norms defining the 
acceptable use of coercion. Consequently, these types of establishment 
terrorism can still be arguably labeled as violence. We can find repre­
sentative cases of official terrorism of this sort in Stalin, Hitler, 
and Pol Pot. Stalin's domination over the Soviet Union from about 1928 
to his death in 1953, provides a wide range of regime terrorism. Perhaps 
the clearest case of terrorism as official policy is not the campaign 
against the peasants who resisted collectivization, but the purge of the 
regime itself in the late 1930s. Old Bolsheviks, current party and gov­
ernment leaders, regular party members, and military officers all fell 
victims to his purge. 10
d. Genocide
The ultimate extension of establishment terrorism carries the in­
stitutionalization of this tactic to an extreme conclusion. Whatever we
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might say about the efforts of Stalin to consolidate his power and 
eliminate any conceivable challenger, the terrorist policy still had 
some limits. Stalin was not intending to liquidate the entire structure 
of party and government. With genocide, in contrast, such tacit limits 
are absent: A particular group is identified as undesirable for one rea­
son or another and then simply eliminated. A policy such as this gener­
ally demands the mobilization of considerable energies and organization. 
Genocide, admittedly, is a term fraught even more layers of emotion and 
ambiguity than the general concept of terrorism.
Ierving Louis Horowitz suggests that a structural characterization 
of genocide should include two points:
First, genocide represents a systematic effort over time 
to liquidate a national population, usually a minority;
Second. it functions as a fundamental political policy to 
Ensure the conformity and participation by the citizenry.1’
The clearest case of twentieth century genocide, in terms of the 
coherent identity of the population affected and the institutionalized 
nature of the means of destruction, remains the Nazi Holocaust against 
the European Jew. The Nazi program came horribly close to achieving com­
plete success. The Nazis, then, legalized, rationalized a policy of ter­
rorist extermination as a "final solution" to a population they defined 
as surplus, subhuman, and expendable.20
F. Roots, Justification, and Source of Terrorism
1. Roots and Justification
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Of our subject matters under consideration, we find their "root" in 
the nature and innate character of person.21 * In justifying activities 
stemming from these "roots" and/ or in identifying such activities, 
being stimulated or influenced by some factors external to minds of men, 
some of us put forth what might be regarded as relevant ideological, 
religions, educational, moral, and other bases, or find media as an 
extremely important factor to be delved into.
More specifically, in the Communist ideology, for Marx the issue 
was not whether violence was right or wrong, but rather whether it was 
effective or useless "for proletariat revolution in the capitalist 
society," according to John Dinse. 22 As a matter of fact, he contin­
ues, Marx "often condemns violence, especially terrorist as ineffective" 
because it was out of step with historic process. Given the historic 
framework of Marx's thought, Marx's basic conclusion on violence is that 
it should be truly revolutionary. Violence is not efficacious unless it 
takes place in the context developed material conditions. He was une­
quivocally critical of terrorism on the grounds that it was out of step 
with the larger, impersonal historic process of revolution.
At the same time, Marx was not opposed to violence in principle. He 
foresaw it as a necessary ingredient in the complex evolution of events 
culminating in socialist revolution. The mobilization of class conscious
Eric Fromm posit two particular character traits strongly associated 
with malignant sadism and necrophilia. Sadism embodies passion to have 
absolute and unrestricted control over a living being. Necrophilia gen­
erally denote the erotic attention to the dead, decayed, putrid, sickly;
it is the passion to transform that which is alive into something 
unalives. Stalin and Hitler may well be ultimate expression, but Fromm 
suggests that these traits are shared, though not be same degree. Far 
more people possess some capacity for cruel and destructive behavior.
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proletariat under the condition of advanced capitalism probably would 
produce an irresistible political force capable of achieving revolution­
ary change with a minimum of violence.
In terms of modern day increases in violence, John Cantelon sheds 
some meaningful light on its "roots" within the educational and relig­
ious perspectives, and the lessons to be learned from the modern day 
educational and religious lives that serve to engender or justify such
destructive activities of person. In contradiction to the expectations
of our liberal heritage, there has been an acceleration in violence in 
our modern age. This is contrary to the assumption of continued social 
progress; and universal education and enlightened religion were to cause 
a decrease in human violence and increase in human cooperation. A compi­
lation of the number of battles fought over the last five centuries is 
enough to contradict that hypothesis:
!. 15th century - - 9 battles
2. 16th century -- 87 battles
3. 17th century -- 239 battles
4. 18th century -- 781 battles
5. 19th century -- 651 battles; and
6. 20th century (so far) -- 892 battles 23.
The three major interrelated religions, Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, all coming out of the same cultural background, also share not 
only a common fratricidal history which J. Toynbee blamed on their ex­
clusiveness claim that each had bad truth but also common concept of 
religion being based upon a covenant.24 In the contemporary scene funda­
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mentalist elements arising to ascendancy within the religious groups, 
use the primitive covenant motif to justify their particular forms of 
violence.
Furthermore, John Cantelon goes on delve into the attitudes and re­
sponses of the so-called moral majority of any given society towards the 
terrorist activities in recent years. 25 To the extent, in addition to 
general ideological, religious, educational, moral and other factors 
serving as roots of terrorism, the "three key components are 
contained within the left terrorist ideology," according to John Dinse: 
First is the assessment of conditions confronting the group or movement, 
with emphasis upon the relative strength and weakness of the revolution­
ary forces vis-S-vis the ruling class.
Secondly, tactics follow from the previous assessment. This dimen­
sion focuses on the organization and action needed in order to bring 
about a revolutionary cataclysm. Finally, although often undeveloped, 
there is usually some sort of post revolutionary vision or program which 
projects outlines of a future "just" society. Inevitably, the strategy 
as a whole stresses capturing or destroying the governmental power and 
economical control of the bourgeoisie with the primary use of abolishing 
existing structure of social privilege.26
2. Contemporary Sources of Terrorism
There will be no shortage of potential causes for terrorism: rising
population; increased poverty and scarcity of resources; racial tension;
inflation and unemployment; increased tension between the "haves" and 
"have nots"; waves of refugees shoved about by war and repression; immi­
grants moving from poor states to wealthier ones, often bringing with
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them the conflicts of their home countries, sometimes causing resentment 
among native citizens; rapid urbanization; the disintegration of tradi­
tional authority structures; the emergence of single issue groups; the 
rise of aggressive fundamentalist religious groups or religious cult.
Yet there is no demonstrable connection between poverty, scarcity, in­
flation or any other socioeconomic indicators and terrorism. Indeed, 
countries experiencing the highest level of terrorism are often among 
the economically and socially most advanced nations in their 
regions or in the world, and often the least authoritarian. 27
Contemporary terrorism seems to come with modern society. Tradi­
tional authority structures have collapsed with ensuing violence 
throughout the history and the present time is no exception.
Ideology and ethnic nationalism have been two major engines of mod­
ern terrorism, ideology drove the urban guerrillas in Latin America and 
their terrorist imitators in Western Europe and the USA. Most of these 
groups adhered to some variation of Marxism. Dreams of independent home­
lands have inspired groups from the IRA to Armenians, and more recently 
religious fanaticism, although directed toward secular ends, and secret 
wars waged by states have accounted for growing share of the world's 
terrorist violence. 28
3. Media
All the forgoing factors notwithstanding, "terrorism" and 
"political violence" are further influenced by media. One of the most 
noticeable developments in recent years has been the increasingly skill­
ful use of publicity by terrorist organizations. The media are of para­
mount importance in their campaigns; the terrorist act by itself is
next to nothing, whereas publicity is all. The real danger of facing the 
terrorist is that of being ignored, receiving insufficient publicity, 
losing the image of the desperate freedom fighter. But the media, con­
stantly in need of diversity and new angles, make fickle friends. Ter­
rorists will always have to innovate. They are, in some respects, the 
superentertainers. With the growth of inexpensive video equipment, 
these groups are very often able to provide news organizations with 
television -- ready footage: messages from terrorist leaders, interviews 
with captives, and even visual records of execution. The PLO owns a 
share in an Arab communication satellite. The western media is vulner­
able to misuse by international terrorists; the fact that terrorism by 
definition tends to be dramatic and pictorial through the terrorist acts 
which take place, make the media vulnerable.
Again, it is not the magnitude of the terrorist operation that 
counts but to whole campaigns. The media have always magnified terrorist 
exploits quite irrespective of their intrinsic importance. Groups num­
bering perhaps a dozen members have been described as armies, their of­
ficial communiques have been discussed in countless television shows, 
radio broadcasts, articles and editorials. Even an apparently illogical 
or senseless attack becomes more effective if given wide coverage in the 
media than an operation against a seemingly obvious target'that is ig­
nored. These strategies work only in societies that have no censor-
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CHAPTER III
The New International Environment 
and Its Source of Terrorism
The characteristics of the current terrorism have been deeply- 
rooted in the new environment after Cold-War period. Therefore, it re­
quires us to look into the ingredients in the current situation which is 
fomenting a new trend of international terrorism.
For forty five years, from World War II's finish to the end of the 
Cold War, most agree that the greatest threat to global security was an 
all-out war between the two superpowers that could perhaps culminate in 
the use of nuclear weapons. In fear of this, government officials and 
concerned citizens sought to diminish the risk of nuclear conflict 
through intensive diplomacy, improved crisis management, arms control, 
and cultural and other exchanges. Because of these efforts and the re­
forms that former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion in 
1985, the risk of a superpower conflict has largely vanished, and the 
world no longer dreads a nuclear conflagration.
The post Cold War era, however, is by no means free of the threat 
of armed conflict, as demonstrated by continuing warfare in areas as di­
verse as Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Indonesia, Liberia, Peru, Somalia, 
Sri Lanka, the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and the for­
mer Yugoslavia. While those conflicts do not have the potential to erupt 
into a nuclear holocaust, they do pose a threat of wide soared regional 
fighting with fearsome death tolls and destruction. Moreover, as weapons
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of mass destruction become more widely diffused, A growing number of 
those original wars will entail a risk of chemical and even nuclear at­
tack. Preventing, controlling, and resolving these conflicts, and imped­
ing the spread of advanced weaponry will, therefore, constitute the 
principal world security tasks of the 1990s and beyond.
A. The Shifting political Landscape
A metaphor popular among analysists thinking about the current 
reshaping of the world is that of "tectonic motion," or the movement of 
the giant "plates" that make up the earth's rocky crust. Because this 
movement can shape continents and alter climates through earthquakes and 
volcanoes it produces, tectonic motion serves as an apt analogy for the 
end of the Cold War and other dramatic changes now occurring throughout 
the world. 1
The geographical metaphor conveys the scale of the changes now un­
der way around the globe and illustrates how surface events are the 
product of deeper sociohistorical forces. Thus, we sense that the drive 
for democracy and human rights in Russia and Eastern Europe is related 
to similar pressure in Burma, Chile, China, Haiti, Mexico, the Philip­
pines, and Thailand. The image of tectonic motion also suggests the 
havoc wreaked by the break up of large empires and federations (notably 
the Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia) and the fracturing of established al­
liances such as the Warsaw Pact and, to a lesser degree, NATO.2
But to adequately describe the security environment of this era af­
ter the Cold War, the tectonics metaphor must be supplemented by an ad­
ditional image -- one that captures the profusion of ethnic, tribal, re­
ligious, and national conflicts that we are witnessing today. Imagine a
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piece of glass laid over a map of the world and then struck by a large, 
heavy weight. The result would be an intricate web of cracks across the 
world, with heavy concentration in some areas but none left entirely un­
scathed.
These cracks represent the many fissures in our multiethnic, multi­
class, and multilingual society - the divisions between rich and poor, 
black and white, Hindu and Muslim, Muslim and Jew, Czech and Slovak, 
Serve and Groat, Azeri and Armenian, and so on. The fissures are 
stressed by the tectonic shifts occurring beneath the surface, but it 
is along their jugged lines that the battles of the post Cold War era 
are being fought.
The fractured-glass analogy suggests that multiplicity of con- 
flictual relationship in the world. Consider for a moment the situation 
in the middle East, which is not just a conflict between the Arab states 
and Israel, or between Iran and Iraq, but rather a far more elaborate 
configuration of animosities. In Lebanon, for instance, it involves Mar- 
inite Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslim, the Druse, and Palestinians; 
In Syria, the Alawites and other Muslims; and in Iraq, Kurds, Sunnis, 
and Shiite. A similar diversity in the conflictual pattern is found in 
the former Yugoslavia, and in the Caucasus region of what was once the 
Soviet Union.
Each of these images - tectonic motion and fractured glaBS - is 
helpful in identifying features of the current World security environ­
ment. However, to best describe this environment it is useful to combine 
the images; for tectonic movement it is useful to combine the images; 
tectonic movements causing massive shifts beneath the surface that in 
turn accentuate and extend the cracks appearing on the surface. By as-
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sessing both the tectonic movements and networks of cracks, we can ar­
rive at a comprehensive picture of current world issues. 3
B. Forces that Destabilize the World Security
It is risky, of course, to attempt an analysis while the world is 
still undergoing transformation. But enough has already occurred on the 
surface for us to be able to begin to understand what is happening be­
low: Six tectonic shifts in particular are worthy of discussion:
1. The Pull of Economic Forces
There was a time, not so long ago, when the "fate of nations" was 
determined largely by political and military factors; most signifi­
cantly, ability of the state to marshall a country's resources for war, 
conquest or defense. Today the state remains a major international ac­
tor, but its capacity to organize resources for its purposes has been 
circumscribed by what has been called 'supranational capitalism.' As the 
economist Robert Heilbroner sees it, the global nexus of multinational 
corporations and international financial institution has accumulated 
vast power and influence at the expense of national capitalism and state 
agencies. This, Hilbroner notes, endows supranational capitalism with 
the ability "to rearrange the global division and distribution of po­
litical and economic power" --a capacity that, when exercised, is often 
"seismic" in its impact. 1
Obviously it is impossible to establish a one-to-one corporation 
between broad economic phenomena and specific world events. But the 
failure of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites to keep 
pace with economic growth in the West contributed to the debilitation of
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the Communist Regime is certain. Unable to generate funds for investment 
in economic and social revitalization, these regimes stagnated and lost 
what remained of their political legitimacy. The eventual result was a 
rapid slide from power, with what had become a corrupt and demoralized 
ruling class putting up little resistance.
The same economic forces are now exacerbating intergroup conflicts 
around the globe. The dissolution of Yugoslavia can be partially attrib­
uted to the desire of the country's stronger units, Crotia and Slovenia, 
to break away from their less advantaged fellow republics and to inte­
grate more closely with the Western European economy. Similarly, the 
breakup of Czechoslovakia can be explained in part by growing resentment 
in Slovakia over the faster pace of economic activities in the Czech Re­
public.
Perhaps even more destabilizing is the widening economic gap be­
tween the industrialized 'North' and underdeveloped 'South'. Most of 
less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have seen 
the difference between their standard of living and that of the wealth­
ier nations widen over the past decade. At the same time, the global 
spread of western culture and consumption pattern via the mass media 
have inculcated an appetite for goods and services not attainable by 
masses of the poor and unemployed. The result is increased North-South 
tensions ranging from the growing militancy of political and religious 
movements with anti-Western theme (movements, for example, like Maoist 
Shining Path in Peru and the Islamic Jihad in Egypt) to more South-to- 
North drug smuggling. Depressed economies in the South are also behind 
the rise in migration to the nations the North itself a growing cause of 
violence in the countries. 5
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2. The Global Diffusion of Power
The rise of supranational capitalism has been accompanied by a dif­
fusion of political, military, and economic power away from the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the two main poles of the Cold war era, to 
other actors in the international order. This has been in progress since 
the 1950s and 1960s, When the Western European countries and Japan be­
gun to recover from the devastating effects of World War II and many 
Third World countries secured their independence; It gained further mo­
mentum in the 1970s and 1980s with the slowdown of economic growth in 
the United States and the Soviet Union and the acquisition of major 
military capabilities by emerging Third World powers. The process culmi­
nated in 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolu­
tion of the Warsaw Pact, and the resulting disappearance of the bipolar 
world.6
As of yet, no clearly defined system of power relationships has 
developed in the place of the bipolar system and the tight alliances of 
the Cold War period. Rather a number of regional power centers - Japan 
in Asia, Germany in Europe, Russia in central Eurasia, the United States 
in North America - have emerged, each surrounded by a cluster of associ­
ated states. These centers cooperate with each other in some matters and 
compete in others; states not aligned with any of the principal clusters 
manage as best they can.
The diffusion of political and military power and the realignment 
of global power relationships have multiple implications for world secu­
rity. With the erosion of superpower influence and the proliferation of 
modern weapons, newly strengthened regional powers see an opportunity to
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pursue their hegemonic ambitions, often provoking fierce conflict in the 
process (as in the case of Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran and its 1990 in­
vasion of Kuwait). Furthermore, the collapse of control over the periph­
ery of what was the Soviet Union has resulted in a series of ethnic and 
territorial classes between components of the empire. And worldwide dif­
fusion of nonnuclear weapons has contributed to the duration and inten­
sity of insurgence and civil and ethnic conflicts. 7
3. Increased Popular Assertiveness at the Grass Roots Level
Paralleling the growth of globalized economic institution and the 
diffusion of political power among international players is the in­
creased assertion at the local and national level of people power. 
Wherever we look in the world today, we find grass-roots citizens move­
ments striving for fundamental change in key social, economic, and po­
litical structures. In China, Haiti, eastern Europe, and the former So­
viet Union, this assertiveness has entailed a drive for democratic 
rights; it has also, however, appeared as anti-foreigner sentiment in 
Germany and increased anti-Semetism in Russia.
By far the most potent manifestation of this grass-roots assertive­
ness is the militant expression of ethnic, national linguistic, and re­
ligious affiliation by peoples who have previously lived peacefully in 
multinational, multicultural societies. This expression takes many forms 
such as the calls for secession by the constituent nationalities of the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; militant assertion of Hindu funda­
mentalism in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt; the Kurdish re­
bellion in Iraq and the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka; and Palestinian 
intifada. As suggested by Myron Weiner of the Massachusetts Institute of
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Technology, "Peoples"—  however they identify themselves by race, relig­
ion, language, tribe, or shared history— want new political institu­
tions or new relationships within existing institutions; when accomm o- 
dation is not forthcoming, they are likely to escalate their demands. 8
The growing assertion of populist claims, whether of a political or 
an ethnic nature, has significant implications for world security. At 
the very least it is jeopardizing the ability of current leaders from 
North and South, East and West, to hold on to power. In many areas it 
has led to violent clashes between members of opposing groups. And in 
Yugoslavia it has created a maelstrom of ethnic fury that threatens to 
engulf much of southeastern Europe.
4. Diminishing power and Authority of Nation-State
Caught between ever more powerful supranational capitalism on one 
side and restive population on the other is the modern nation-state. Al­
though still among the actors with most clout on the international 
stage, the state is steadily losing ground to international financial 
institutions and well-organized ethic and religious constituencies. This 
is evident both in the ability of the International Monetary Fund to 
dictate government spending practices in many Third World and eastern 
European countries, and in that of Muslim clerics to affect foreign pol­
icy in Iran and Saudi Arabia.
To a great extent, the decline in the power of the nation-state is 
a product of a global revolution of rising expectations at a time of in­
creased international economic competition. People still count on their 
state to play the game of wealth effectively and thus attain or protect 
high standards of living. But state authorities have less control over
44
their economies than before, and when they fail to satisfy popular ex­
pectations invite popular revolt - - through electoral channels where 
that option exists, through rioting and civil strife where it does 
not. 9
The replacement of older, unrepresentative regimes by new, popular­
ity backed governments in the Soviet bloc and elsewhere has not, unfor­
tunately, always resulted in greater social stability. In many cases new 
regimes have played the game of wealth with even less success than their 
predecessors, resulting in widespread discontent and a risk of coups 
and mob action. To retain their hold on power, some of these regimes —  
notably those in Serbia —  have turned to ultranationalism as a solu­
tion, thereby provoking fresh outbreaks of ethnic violence. In other 
cases, there has been a ceding of authority to local warlords and secre­
tarial forces; in extreme cases, the state has simply withered away, 
giving free rein to the sort of gang warfare seen in Liberia and Soma­
lia.
5. The Rise of the "Weapon" State with New Capabilities
Adding to dangers posed by all the factors described above is the 
global proliferation of modern weapons and the technologies for produc­
ing them.
Such proliferation entails not only the spread of nuclear, chemi­
cal, and biological weapons -- the so-called weapon of mass destruction 
but also a wide range of "conventional" arms (tanks, planes, guns, and 
missiles used by regular military forces). Both sorts of weapons are 
finding their way into arsenals of more and more nations, thereby stimu­
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lating local arms races and ensuring that future wars will be fought ev- 
erascending lethality and destructiveness. 10
In the nuclear realm, the five declared nuclear weapons powers 
(United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China) have been 
joined by three undeclared nucleared ones (Israel, India, and Pakistan). 
While Iran, Iraq, and North Korea continue their efforts to develop such 
weapon, and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan re­
tain a capacity to do so in the future (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukrane 
inherited some nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, but have 
pledged to turn them over to Russian authorities. Still, many analysts 
worry about the possible spread of former Soviet nuclear materials and 
technology).
As for chemical weapons, American intelligence officials have iden­
tified 14 Third World countries believed to possess an offensive chemi­
cal warfare capability: Burma, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam.11 
Many of these nations have also engaged in research on biological weap­
ons, and have acquired ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver 
nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads. We have already witnessed 
the extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and in 
Iraq's subsequent campaign to liquidate Kurdish villages in strategic 
border areas. Iraq also threatened chemical attacks against Israel in 
1990 and 1991, and Israel officials responded with threat of possible 
nuclear retaliation. Central Intelligence Agency officials have reported 
that India and Pakistan were prepared to use nuclear weapons in 1990, 
when it was feared that the fighting in Kashmir would spark a full-scale 
conflict. 12
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The proliferation of advanced conventional arms has proceeded at a 
pace with that of weapons of mass destruction. According to estimates 
by the Congressional Research Service, Third World countries spent 
$339.5 billion on imported weapons from 1983 to 1990 (in constant 1990 
US dollars) -- which translates into some 13,010 tanks and self- 
propelled guns, 27,430 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,920 supersonic com­
bat planes, 38,430 surface to air missiles, and 53,790 surface-to- 
surface missiles. These weapons sustained the Iran-Iraq war of 1980- 
1988 and other regional conflicts, and swelled the arsenals of emerging 
powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 13
Security analysts are also worried about the growing diffusion of 
advanced conventional weapons. As military spending in NATO and the for­
mer Warsaw pact fails, arms manufactures in these countries, whether 
state-owned or private, are increasingly disposed to export their prod­
ucts to the Third World, where the demand for modern weapons is high and 
likelihood of their being used in combat is growing. The stockpiles 
built up by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies during the Cold 
War era constitute a vast reservoir of surplus arms that are increas­
ingly finding their way into the black market —  and thus, into the 
hands of terrorists, guerrillas, separatist forces, and other irregular 
formations that threaten the peace in many areas of the world.
Chemical and biological weapons add several complications to al­
ready difficult regional conflicts.
First, their potential use can add to heightened tensions before 
war occurs, panicking the populations and making the decision to war 
more likely. Second, destroying these weapons before they are used 
would be a high priority target. Third, the use of such weapons can only
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increase the desperation of the participants as well as the motivation 
for revenge in the target population, thereby making it more difficult 
to end a war already begun. The fourth problem is that, if chemical 
possession is perceived as desirable or necessary, the proliferation of 
such weapons may be more difficult to control than even nuclear 
weapons.
The key to nuclear nonproliferation has been the denial of access 
to fuel grade plutonium. However, the basic ingredients from which 
chemical weapons are produced are commonly available; monitoring and 
controlling the situation is difficult.
Our recent experience with chemical weapons is limited to two 
cases, both involving Iraq. In the later stage of the 1980-88 war with 
Iran, Iraq used chemicals against Iranian troops as well as its own 
Kurdish minority. It also engaged in terrorist missile attack against 
Iranian cities. Experts disagree about how effective the chemical weap­
ons were in these situations, but they agree that the Iranian-Iraq war 
proved that ability to employ such weapons. 14
Proliferation of arms of all types is certain to figure as a pri 
mary security concern in the 1990s and beyond because it helps increase 
the number, length, and duration of conventional conflicts and also in 
creases the risk that future wars will involve the use of weapons of 
mass destruction, whether deliberate or accidental.
6. Population Growth Environmental Decline
The erosion of the state's power and authority has been acceler­
ated, in many instances, by a sixth tectonic force: rapid population 
growth is not by itself a cause of instability - historically, it has
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often contributed to the health and vigor of societies, as in the case 
of the United States. But when population increases exceed the rate of 
economic growth (as in many Third World countries today), and when they 
contribute to the depletion of valuable resources (such as tropical for­
ests and tillable soil), the ability of states to engage in long-term 
economic and social development is impaired - thus ensuring worse hard­
ship and unrest in future.
The world population now stands at about 5.5 billion people, and 
this figure is expected to double by the middle of the twenty first cen­
tury. 15 Such a jump could theoretically be sustained if the planet's 
products were developed to replace those natural substances being de­
pleted. But resources are not evenly distributed, and new products 
might not be available at an affordable price to all who need them. As 
things stand now, many states in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America are 
not able to provide for burgeoning number of young people, and will be 
even less able to do in the future. The consequences include a rising 
incidence of hunger and malnutrition, increased migration from the im­
poverished countryside to the urban shantytown, soaring unemployment 
(especially among youth),and the growing appeal of extremist move­
ments .16
Even if population growth is stabilized, the world must still con­
tend with the problem arising from human-induced degradation of the en­
vironment. Much has been written about the long-term effects of global 
warming and depletion of the atmosphere's ozone layer, and on their im­
plications for human, plants, and animal population; much less, however, 
is known about the impact of environmental decline on intergroup and in­
terstate relation. Preliminary research suggests that environmental de­
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cline, especially when it occurs in environmentally stressed areas of 
the Third World (deserts, rainforests, hillsides, coastal lowlands) will 
exacerbate intergroup competition and conflict and drive yet more people 
into crowded urban shantytowns where the prospects for meaningful em­
ployment are dim and the danger of unrest is high. 17
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CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF POST COLD WAR 
TERRORISM
A. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instruments of Foreign Policy
1. The Implication of International Terrorism
United States Secretary of Defense, W. Weinberger in remarks made 
in 1986 to the American Bar Association National Conference on terrorism 
stated:
The face of international terrorism is constantly changing 
as it increases ... The number of terrorist groups has mul­
tiplied.
We have also seen the advent or at least resurgence, of sui­
cidal terrorist and fanatical, pseudo-religious doctrines 
that extol terrorism. Terrorists have developed collaborate- 
tive networks. They have gained better access to internatio­
nal arms market and have acquired more sophisticated weapons 
and explosives...Terrorists have refined their planning, in­
telligence and targeting methods, often surveying their 
victims for months...Terrorists have discovered new source 
of funding through crime. In addition to their traditional 
bank robberies, they have entered the lucrative narcotics 
trade. Terrorists have become skilled managers of their 
financial assets using secretive banking channels and inves­
ting large sums in legitimate business in the United States 
and elsewhere. Finally, we are confronted with the spread 
of state-sponsored terrorism...
These comments do reflect an evolution in the understanding of in­
ternational terrorism, suggesting a deeper understanding of terrorists 
that goes beyond the traditional and outdated perspective of terrorism 
as an act performed only by madmen.1
The term international terrorism covers a number of different issues in 
the contemporary world, from state sponsored terrorism against foreign
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countries to cooperation between various terrorist groups. It also fre­
quently refers to attacks against foreign nationals or property in the 
terrorists' own country or anywhere else. None of this is new: there 
have been conspiratorial ties between revolutionary (and counter revo­
lutionary) groups in Europe since the early part of the nineteenth cen­
tury. A British committee of investigation into terrorism in India 
noted that, together with the emphasis on religious motives, Bengali 
terrorist propaganda dwelt heavily upon the Russian rules of 
revolutionary violence. 2
Terrorism that qualifies as international or transnational involves 
actions in which the nationality of the victims is different from that 
of the perpetrators, or the operation is extraterritorial, located out­
side the boundaries of a contested area. The US State Department de­
fines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpe­
trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." To be interna­
tional, it must involve the citizens or territory of more than one 
country. 3
Such terrorism strongly reflects the interdependence of the inter­
national system. It would not be possible if nations were not linked in 
complex networks of mutual political and economical interest. Were 
there no tourists, no diplomats and no business travelers, terrorism 
could not have assumed the form it has. International terrorism has 
been characterized most notably by attacks on diplomats or diplomatic 
facilities, on civil aviation (aircraft and airports) and on foreign 
businessmen, journalists and educators. Its second important character­
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istic is the seizure of hostages in order to bargain with their govern­
ments or with the host government where the kidnapping or barricade oc­
curs. Terrorism has become a modern form of coercive bargaining, in 
which the terrorists have the initiative. Their demands usually include 
the release of prisoners, the payment of a monetary ransom, or the pub­
lication of a communication.
2. Support Mechanism in International Terrorism
There are seven essential prerequisites for mounting terrorism. 
There must be some main aim or motivation among the perpetrators, even 
if it ultimately amounts to little more than an intense hatred of their 
perceived enemies or a desire for violent revenge against some alleged 
insjustice. There must be leaders to instigate and direct the struggle. 
In any sustained and significant campaign, there will also need to be 
some degree of organization, some training in the special skill of ter­
rorism, and cash that helps to buy weapons and ammunitions and other es­
sential needs. Finally, it is clearly vital for the terrorists that they 
should have access to the target country and precise targets selected 
within that country.
Exactly the same basic ingredients are required to mount a viable 
campaign of international terrorism. But they will require signifi­
cantly greater level of organization, training expertise, cash and means 
of access to foreign states, to wage a full international campaign. Let 
us identify some of the major types of support mechanisms involved in 
contemporary international terrorism:
a. Cells of predominantly indigenous Terrorist 
Organizations
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Very few cases exist of purely indigenous movements. Terrorism 
tends to have inherent tendencies toward internationalization. But by 
no means do all groups operate outside their borders or resort to hi­
jacking airliners or attacking foreign diplomats. The Basque ETA and 
the IRA, for example, generally confine their actions to the domestic 
arena of conflict (which for the IRA includes Great Britain and the Re­
public of Ireland).
So, too, to do Tamil separatists in Srilanka. However, as the in­
terests of such groups shift, so do their targets. ETA, for example, 
has begun to attack French targets because of French decision to extra­
dite ETA members to Spain. Sikh separatists and Armenian terrorists 
have local aims but act on the international scene. International ter­
rorism represents a type of strategy, not a type of terrorism,
b. Cells of Terrorist Groups in Exile
These groups are utterly dependent on their international support 
base because they have been forced by political circumstances or neces­
sity to operate entirely abroad. Well-known examples are the Armenian 
terrorist groups, such as the Armenian Secret Army for the liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA), and the Croatians scattered in many Western countries. 
These groups can draw on invaluable local bases of support among sympa­
thizers in the emigrant population of major western cities. These pro­
vide sanctuary, fundraising sources of weapon and esqplosives: on the 
other hand, they are generally desperately conscious of their weakness 
in political and military terms, and find it impossible to gain state 
sponsorship. Few states wish to back a loser. They are potentially 
vulnerable to police and political reaction by their hosts in the states 
to which they have immigrated. They can be easily identified, and they
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risk a backlash against their small countries if they make trouble 
abroad.
All terrorist groups are prone to schism and splits, sometimes over 
matters of fundamentalism and program but more often on questions of 
leadership, organization and tactics. Exile groups are especially vul­
nerable to this type of organizational fragmentation. Many exiled ter­
rorist movements have been paralyzed, or rendered virtually ineffective, 
by internecine conflict. For example, the Palestinian movement in exile 
suffers from a bitter split between the pro-Arafat and anti-Arafat fac­
tions, frequently spilling over into assassination and revenge killings 
of Palestinian leaders abroad.
c. Mixed indigenous and Multinational groups and Alliances
The mixing of indigenous and international terrorist support bases 
can be easily illustrated in relation to the Shi'ite fundamentalist 
revolutionaries. In Iran, in Lebanon, and the other major centers of 
Shiite population there is a constant emphasis on achieving dominance of 
their religious ideas in their own societies. Yet simultaneously, and 
interdependent with these efforts, the Shiite movements, such as the 
Islamic Jihad, are also consciously engaged in wider "holy war" to ex­
port Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and practice to the whole of the Muslim 
world. For this wider purpose, the Shiite militants can call an impres­
sive support base in Iran in the form of religious ideas and propaganda, 
religious leadership, a fair degree of centralized coordination and or­
ganization, cash weapon, and Iran's diplomatic and spying network.
Another interesting variant of the "mixed" support base is the
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comparatively new alliance of extreme left terrorist groups in Western 
Europe against NATO and defense-related targets. It is clear that all 
the groups involved «— Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, Action 
Directe (AD) in France, and the Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium —  
on the one hand continue to wage their own private war against govern­
ments, law-enforcement systems and other key institutions in their re­
spective states. Hence, the hunger-strike campaign of the RAF in early 
1985, was aiming, without success, to intimidate the authorities into 
relocating all RAF prisoners in the same goal.
Yet on the other hand, those who study the evidence surely cannot 
doubt that a genuinely new, if loosely coordinated, international alli­
ance of these groups is attempting to mount a West European campaign 
against NATO.
d. Indirect State Sponsorship, via Surrogate and Client 
Groups
Indirect state sponsorship occurs when a government decides to aid 
a particular movement or group on the ground that it will serve the 
strategic and political interest of the sponsor. It is generally 
adopted as a policy for one or more of the following purpose: to re­
dress an international grievance, to export revolution, to hunt down and 
eradicate exiled dissidents or to intimidate them into silence, to 
weaken an adversary state, and a auxiliary weapon in a wider war of in­
tervention or international war.
In the course of the Arab-Israel conflict on the issue of the Pal­
estinians, many states have intervened by giving indirect sponsorship 
and help to factions of the PLO. The major funds of the PLO groupings 
are derived from the contribution of the rich Arab oil Btates, and there 
is abundant evidence of the very substantial military support given to
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A1 Fatah and other main PLO formations since the mid 1970s. The Soviets 
were happy to use Yassir Arafat and his movement as a stalking horse to 
try quietly to expand Russian influence in the Middle East. Documents 
captured in the 1982 war in Lebanon confirm also the substantial Soviet 
and Eastern European stake in training PLO members.
Normally it is exceedingly difficult to establish beyond doubt the 
identity of a state sponsor indirectly implicated in this type of inter­
national terrorist attack. A major aim of a state sponsor is to remain 
covert, at the very least to be able plausibly to deny any involvement. 
It is should be also that sponsorship takes an any forms. Help and en­
couragement, even the provision of false documents and weapons does not 
necessarily mean that state sponsor has total control over the choice of 
target and method of attack. Many of the militants and experienced Pal­
estinian groups, for example, are quite capable of running such opera­
tions autonomously, providing their own logistics, if need arises. A 
further complication is that some of these groups have a number of state 
sponsors helping them simultaneously in various ways. Consequently, 
they are able to establish safe havens and operational bases in several 
different countries. A logical consequence of this complex form of al­
liance with multilateral indirect state sponsorship is that even if co­
ercion or pressure succeeds in one state sponsor to disengage from sup­
port the terrorist group itself will still be able to continue its ac­
tivities using other resources. Hence, even if one state sponsor fears 
reprisal and does try to rein them in, it may not succeed,
e. Direct State Sponsorship 
Some state sponsors have tried to avoid the uncertainty and prob­
lems of indirect sponsorship by resorting to direct state controlled in­
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ternational terrorism, using their own hit-squads to assassinate oppo­
nents, disrupt, or undermine adversaries. The Libyan and Iranian re­
gimes blatantly flout international norms and laws by such behavior.
For example, Colonel Gadafi openly boasts of his intention to murder 
President Mubarak and Western leaders and his plan to hunt down and mur­
der his exiled opponents, whom he describes as the stray dogs. In
1985 alone there were seven major incidents involving actual or abortive
attacks by Gaddafi hit-squads on opponents of the regime abroad, includ­
ing murderers committed in Rome, Nicosia, and Bonn.
It should be noted that although diplomatic cover and facilities 
have frequently been used in recent years for direct state sponsored 
terrorism, especially by Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran, there are many 
other ways in which such attacks can be mounted. The assassination 
squad used by the secret services of terrorist states may be sent on 
their missions under many different types of cover as students, business 
men even, simply tourists. In the open and easily accessible West hid­
den assassins are most impossible to identify and apprehend. 4
3. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instrument of Foreign Policye 
With the Cold War over, the breakdown of the bi-polar system and 
accompanying diffusion of politic power has brought substantial change 
in terrorist network and sponsorship.
An interpretation that gained popularity in the United States dur­
ing the 1980s holds that terrorism primarily reflects conflict between 
the United States and the former Soviet Union or World communism. 5 
The proponents of this view argue that ideological affinity motivates 
radical non-state organizations to act as the pliant accomplices of en­
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emy states, including Iran, and Libya as well as the then Soviet Union. 
To this school of thought, terrorist organizations and their government 
supports are linked to a global network, so that all incidents of ter­
rorism, however disparate, are actually a manifestation of the same ma­
licious intent. Terrorism is perceived as a potent yet widely ignorant 
threat to the internal stability and foreign interest of Western democ­
racies .
This Cold War view finds that terrorism has become an attractive 
strategy for the actors in international politics, preferable to conven­
tional or nuclear warfare, which has become too risky and too expensive, 
and that its uses by hostile states give terrorism the potential to al­
ter the international balance of power. This position leads to advocacy 
of a tougher response to terrorism and accusation that the leaders of 
Western democracies are blind to the threat, lacking in resolve, con­
fused, weak and vacillating. Its implication is that terrorism is the 
problem caused by states, not by dissident undergrounds with agendas of 
their own. Terrorist organizations are denied any autonomy. The threat 
of terrorism is thus elevated to a position of high significance for na­
tional security.
However, in reality there is no monolithic terrorist entity. In­
stead terrorism appears highly elective and pluralistic. In 1985, over 
sixty different organizations were noted as engaged in international 
terrorism. Fifty were counted in 1986 and fifty-six in 1987. 6
Major perpetrators of the acts of international terrorism account 
for roughly half of all incidents, which shows that the distribution of 
responsibility for terrorism is broad. The highest ranking group, the 
Islamic Jihad, accounted for 8.7 percent of all incidents in 1985. In
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1986 the MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in Peru led with 6.6 
percent followed by the Colombian ELN (National Liberation Army) and the 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, each with 8.2 percent. In gen­
eral, Middle Eastern terrorism, whether Palestinian or Lebanese, ac­
counts for over half all international terrorist incidents, which in 
1985 spilled over into Western Europe. In 1985, eighty-four countries 
were victimized by international terrorism; in 1986, the number was 
seventy-eight.
The alliance among these organizations is tenuous. A recent study 
of international terrorism concludes that coalition among groups is in­
frequent, ad hoc and short in duration. 7
The commonality of interest among terrorist organizations does not 
seem sufficient to sustain long-term operational cooperation, although 
the fact of transient linkage is undeniable. In 1987, the "Anti- 
Imperialist International Brigade," thought to be an alliance of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian and the Japanese Red 
Army, carried out four relatively amateurish attacks against Western 
targets, including the Venice summit meeting. In 1972,however, their 
cooperation produced deadly results when an attack on an arriving Air 
France flight at Israel's Lod airport left 28 dead and 76 wounded.
An important reason for the conclusion that terrorism threatens in­
ternational security is the charge of state sponsorship. Many observers 
think that terrorism is likely to become a form of surrogate warfare, 
employed equally by nonstates and by states too weak to mount a conven­
tional military challenge. In 1985, the US Department of State consid­
ered 12 percent of international terrorist incidents to be state sup­
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ported, the majority by Middle Eastern governments. State-support was 
thought to be linked to the increasing destructiveness of terrorism, 
which in 1984 killed 20 percent more people than the average of the pre­
ceding four years. The British strategic theorist Lawrence Freedman 
agrees that state sponsorship challenges international security, but 
warns that the need to justify policies of military retaliation is 
likely to lead to an exaggeration of this threat. 8
The precise relationship between states and the terrorist under­
ground is difficult to determine. Some states have provided financial 
and logistical support that has made international terrorism possible, 
but whether the dependency relationship thus created entails state con­
trol over the actions of such groups is hard to know. Iran seems to in­
fluence but not determine the fate of foreign hostages held by Hezbollah 
in Lebanon.
Linkage between states and undergrounds are not uncommon, although 
they only came to the attention of Western governments in the 1980s. 
Since 1967, Arab states have maintained affiliation with various Pales- 
tinian-groups, the Fatah Revolutionary Council. Reliance on proxies 
seems to be favored over the direct use of government agents, but both 
practices are familiar in the Middle East.
These international conspiracy theories have no convincing evidence 
for a unified terrorist network, but a "Cold War" international situa­
tion provided circumstantial evidence that the bloc used terrorist 
sponsorship as an instrument of foreign policy.
Official former Soviet spokesmen have always condemned terrorism, 
denouncing it as adventurist, elitist and objectively serving the inter­
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ests. Yet, at the same time, the Soviet Union has provided arms, finan­
cial aid, military training and, on occasion, political support to vari­
ous terrorist groups. In practice, as distinctive from doctrine, Soviet 
Russia has given selective support to "national liberation movements" 
employing terrorist means. It has also assisted some groups, which even 
by stretching a vivid imagination,cannot be classified as belonging to 
the "national liberation" camp. Furthermore, it had closely cooperated 
with the countries that had been main sponsors of international terror­
ism, Libya and Syria. In the overall Soviet strategy of increasing its 
influence in the Third World and weakening the NATO allies, terrorist 
activities play a certain, albeit minor role. The difficulty as seen 
from Moscow is that support for terrorism is a fine art, that it is ef­
fective only in certain conditions, and that, like certain medicine, it 
may have unpleasant side effects.
If the Western government has charged the Soviet bloc with much of 
the responsibility for international terrorism, the Soviet Union and its 
allies have argued that Western governments, and above all the United 
States, have been the main inspirers of terrorism. Instances of Western 
involvement in various Third World insurgencies can be found without 
difficulty. The United States supported the "Contra" in Nicaragua and 
Angola, Israel has kept a militia in South Lebanon, the French inter­
vened in Chad, the Britain (indirectly) in some of the minor Persian 
Gulf Principalities —  not to mention the massive help given to the Af­
ghan revels by American via Pakistan.
The difference between Western and Soviet as well as Libyan, Syr­
ian, and Iranian involvement was both quantitative and qualitative in
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character. The Western countries are Status Quo oriented. They want to 
prevent insurgency and other forms of destabilization and, from a purely 
technical point of view, they are all ill-equipped to deal with such 
contingencies. The Russians and their allies had not only greater expe­
rience and competence in this field, they do not have to render accounts 
to their parliaments, and their media do not report the support given to 
terrorist allies. While Russia had its proxies such as Cuba or Bul­
garia, America had no such substitutes. If, despite these handicaps, a 
terrorist plot is nevertheless hatched from time to time in the West, it 
is usually bungled, causing a major scandal and the downfall of those 
who ordered it. The French operation against the Rainbow Warrior ship 
in New Zealand was a perfect example. Moral and political inhibition 
quite apart, the question of Western and Eastern support for terrorism 
made little sense; it is like equating the achievements of professionals 
with amateurs. 9
With the advent of the post Cold War era, the change has brought 
little room for these bi-polarlized manipulations of international ter­
rorism. The fundamental effects on the end of the Cold War include not 
only the termination of the military confrontation between the former 
Soviet Union and United States, but also that old competition is highly 
unlikely to reoccur. First, a main change came in Russian foreign pol­
icy. New thinking in the changed policy renounced the Breznev doctrine, 
which asserted the right of Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of a be­
leaguered Socialist movement worldwide. It was replaced by the asser­
tion that the sovereign right of nations should be honored without in­
terference. One result was to reduce the competition between the East 
and West in Third World countries. Problems remained in the area of
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long-standing competition (such as, Angola, and Mozambique), though 
there were attempts to work them out. Neither side looked for new com­
mitments or opportunities. The Russian motivation appeared to be dual. 
On one hand, the competition was usually costly and the benefits of it 
short-lived. On the other hand, East-West competition in the Third World 
was just another irritant in overall relations. Faced with the need to 
reduce tension in order to gain success to Western assistance, backing 
away from a losing propositions was a mild price for the Russians to 
pay.
Also, the former Soviet Union simply cannot afford to subsidize 
Third World movements; in fact, they were cutting loose as many of their 
old clients as possible, including Castro's Cuba, before the Soviet Un­
ion dissolved, which helps make Russia and other republics appear as re­
sponsible members of the international system. Above all there is sim­
ply not much Third World interest in the new Russia. The old Soviet 
system is not something to emulate; rather, it is something to avoid at 
all costs.
Now, the United States and Russia are cooperating and sharing re­
sponsibility for the anti-terrorist effort on a global scale (as in the 
Gulf-War and Bosnian affairs). 10
B. The Characteristics of Dissident Terrorism
!. Nationalist Terrorism: Ethnic Nationalism in War
The forces, mentioned in the causes of post Cold War terrorism, act 
on the peoples, states, and societies of the world in such a way as to 
exacerbate existing tensions between groups and in many cases, to pro­
voke or intensify conflict. The resulting struggles take several forms,
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all of which have become all-too-common features of the global environ­
ment .
One manifestation is the world's decomposing empire and super­
states. By far the most striking products of the Cold War's end and 
communism's demise, has been the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union was an empire, assembled through centuries 
of conquest by both Russian Czars and their Communist successors, and 
the modern superstate, uniting many individual nations in one centrally 
administered, confederated system. Yugoslavia also possessed attributes 
of empire and confederation. A system of that sort can survive only 
when the center possessed enough strength to subdue separatist pressure 
in the periphery, and when there are sufficient social, economical, and 
political links between the disparate parts to resist the centrifugal 
force that inevitably tears at such an assemblage.
With the collapse of communism —  the binding agent in both the So­
viet Union and Yugoslavia —  and growing impact of tectonic forces, 
these two superstates broke up in 1991. The individual groups that had 
constituted them sought to establish full sovereignty over what they 
viewed as their rightful territory. As suggested by past instances of 
imperial decomposition, such as the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman Empire after World War I, the process inevitably spawns discord 
and conflict. Pieces of new international boundaries (hence fighting be­
tween ethnic groups in Bosnia and between Armenian and Azarbaijans), 
and the ethnic minority find themselves trapped within alien and inhos­
pitable states (hence the struggles of the Abkhazians and South Os­
setians in Georgia, the Ingush and Chechens in Russia, the ethnic Rus­
sian in Modova, and the ethic Albanians in the Kosvo region of Serbia).
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Such struggles are not limited to the former Soviet Union and Yugo­
slavia; other multinational superstates are feeling the vibration of 
tectonic forces. Hence the survival of Canada remains in doubt as the 
French-speaking people of Quebec continue to seek greater autonomy from 
the English speaking provinces, while India has experienced significant 
separatist pressures in Kashmir, the Panjab, and Assam. Ethiopia, once 
an imperial kingdom, has long been troubled by armed separatist move­
ments in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, and is likely to experience 
renewed conflict if these pressures are not relieved. Two other Third 
World superstates, China and Indonesia, continue to encounter resistance 
on their peripheries (the former in Tibet, the latter in East Timor) and 
will likely come under intensified pressure from separatist 
in the future.
Accompanying the breakup of large multinational states has come a 
surge in ethnonationalist and irredentist struggles as ethnic groups 
that have been denied a state (or have had theirs submerged in a 
larger multinational entity) seek to establish one, and as other groups 
already in possession of a state seek to enlarge it so as to incorporate 
adjacent territories occupied by large number of their kinsmen. Such 
impulses have long sparked fighting, but seems to have gained renewed 
vigor in recent years as the bipolar system broke the balance of power 
between state authorities and populist elements shifted in favor of the 
latter. As has been noted, ethnonationalist forces are evident in the 
separatist struggles in the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, China, 
and Indonesia. Other groups engaged in like struggles include the Kurds 
in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
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Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Shan and Karen people of Burma, and the Basques 
of France and Spain.
Major irredentist struggles include the Serbians' campaign to 
create "Greater Serbia" out of the remains of the remnants of 
Yugoslavia, Armenia's push to gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh (now 
controlled by Azerbaizan), and China's continuing efforts to repossess 
Taiwan. Many fear that irredentists in Hungary will press for the in­
corporation of Hungarian-speaking regions of Slovakia, Romania, and the 
former Yugoslavia in a "Greater Hungary."
THE CASE IN THE POINT: New World order and Lessons of the Bosnian War
1. Reporting the tragic situation of the Bosnian War, the July 31, 
1933 New York Times reported 200,000 dead, most of them civilian, in­
cluding the victims of the detention camps and the children dying for 
lack of medical supplies. There has been mass rape. More than two mil­
lion people are homeless; some 573,000 refugees sinking the already 
foundering economics of Groatia and the rump Yugoslavia(Serbia and Mon­
tenegro) and 640,000 others destabilizing neighboring countries, the 
rest moving from town to town ahead of shifting battle lines. The num­
ber of people who have been killed or left homeless is on a scale not 
seen in Europe since the Second World War.
2. The disintegration of the Yugo federation and its interethic 
violence cannot be attributed to any single factor. Internal political 
conflicts in the 1980, and the effort by Serbian leader Slobodan Mi­
losevic to mobilize Serb nationalism on behalf of a strengthened federa­
tion, destroyed the cohesion of the country's regional Communist leader-
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ship and weakened their control over society. Deteriorating economical 
conditions •—  especially plummeting living standards eroded the bene­
fits of sustaining the Yugoslav state and stimulated the rise of mass 
nationalism and interethnic hostilities. The conflicting nationalist 
aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples and their leaders' effort to maxi­
mize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed territories.
The end of the Cold War left both Soviet and Western policy makers 
believing that Yugoslavia no longer held the strategic significance, or 
merited the attention it had enjoyed in a world divided between East and 
West. This mistaken belief, as well as the attention commanded by the 
Persian Gulf War, led to the neglect of the brewing crisis in Yugoslavia 
until the cost of meaningful action had risen beyond the point accept­
able to Western policy makers and their publics. Even when less costly 
but still effective action remained possible. Western policy makers were 
deterred from acting by the fear that the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
even if achieved through peaceful negotiations, would hasten the disin­
tegration of the Soviet Union.
The fall of Yugoslavia thuB can be attributed to internal conflict 
and the international community's failure to respond to the crisis ef­
fectively. However, forceful action by either Yugoslav leaders or 
American and European administration would have required innovative 
thinking about some of the most basic principles of the international 
system and the post Cold War security framework in Euro-Atlantic commu­
nity. No political leadership -- Yugoslav, American, or European was 
then ready to confront these tasks, therefore, it may be the stimulus 
that it has provided for such new thinking.
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3. The wars in the former Yugoslavia have made it clear that the 
principles and practices that provided a stable frame work for interna­
tional security in the era of the Cold War is no longer sufficient to 
preserve the peace. The principle of state sovereignty, territorial in­
tegrity, human rights, and self-determination embedded in the United Na­
tions Charter and other United Nations Documents, and developed in de­
tails in the documents of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), have proved contradictory, or at least subject to contra­
dictory interpretation. Moreover, the mounting human tragedy in Bosnia 
has revealed the inadequacies of the decision making principles, opera­
tional guidelines, and conflict management capabilities of Euro-Atlantic 
institutions such as the CSCE, NATO, and the European Community, as well 
as the United Nations.
New diplomatic and political mechanisms must be developed to cope 
with demands for self-determination in ways that do not undermine the 
basic foundation of international stability «*. the system of sovereign 
states.
The developments of such mechanisms require reconstruction of the 
meaning of self-determinations in the contemporary era and the careful 
reconsideration of the indivisibility of state sovereignty. At the very 
least, it requires limiting the ability of states to use their claim to 
sovereignty to shield abuses from international inequity. For any 
mechanism, however, individual state and international organization 
alike must become more provocative, undertaking preventive diplomatic 
and political efforts to solve interethnic and other conflicts before 
they threaten international peace.
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International engagement in the Yugo crisis as early as 1990 would 
have remained futile if the Western states had continued to refuse to 
support the redrawing of borders as a possible path to a peacefully ne­
gotiated solution to the crisis. The declaration of independence by a 
territorially compact ethic community, such as that of the Serbs in 
Croatia or any other group in Yugoslavia, could have been recognized as 
a legitimate demand for self-determination. By recognizing the equal 
rights of all peoples in the country to self-determination, interna­
tional mediators might have been able to lead local actors toward mutual 
concession. The key to such negotiations, however, lies in the recogni­
tion that international principles, and the rights derived from them, 
are equally applicable to all parties, as well as in a willingness to 
undertake the negotiation of borders. This, the international community 
failed to do.
Early insistence by outside powers on the democratic legitimiza­
tion of existing borders might have encouraged greater concern for the 
protection of human rights and avoided the escalation of ethnic tensions 
in Grotia and Bosnia. The Communist order that held Yugoslavia together 
began to disintegrate as early as 1986. It entered into a crisis in De­
cember 1989. This left sufficient opportunity for international actors 
to influence events. The importance in such a situation of clearly and 
forcefully articulating and enforcing the human rights standards to 
which states seeking recognition will be held cannot be overemphasized. 
By doing so international actors may affect popular perceptions and 
politics. In Yugoslavia, for example, the regional elections held in 
1990 might have produced more moderate governments if the human rights 
standards of potential ruling parties had been at issue.
The existence of competing claims to territory complicated the 
Yugoslav crisis. But it does not by itself account for the magnitude of 
human destruction that has occurred. The extreme violence in Yugoslavia 
must also be attributed to the establishment of ethnically defined gov­
ernments that failed to provide democratic safeguards for the human 
rights of minority communities. This reinforces the conclusion that if 
the international community is to facilitate the peaceful settlement of 
such conflicts elsewhere, it must devise the means to prevent ethnic 
domination and safeguard human rights. In short, principles of sover­
eignty, territorial integrity, and national self determination must be 
integrated into a single frame work for determining the legitimacy of 
claims to political authority. And that framework must be based on the 
superiority of principle human rights and democracy.11
2. Revolutionist Terrorism
a. Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism has largely 
dissipated, revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an 
attraction for downtrodden and dispossessed peoples. Such movements 
promise a change of leaders but a sweeping transformation of society, 
typically involving the elimination of existing institutions and their 
replacement by more righteous or egalitarian structures. Movements 
of this sort appear to be gaining strength in areas, where economic 
conditions have worsened for the majority (or for particular groups) and 
where the capacity or inclination of state authorities to overcome wide­
spread impoverishment and millenarians groups in such areas appear in­
creasingly willing to employ violence in their effort to reform society.
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At present two main types of revolutionary crusades can be dis­
cerned: ideological or political movements, usually attempting to end 
exploitation of the poor by the middle class and the rich; and religious 
fundamentalism, entailing a drive to subject all social interaction to 
religious law and practice. Examples of the first types include the 
Shining Path in Peru, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of 
Elsalvador, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and the new Peoples Army in the 
Philippines; example of the second category would be the Hindu fundamen­
talist Bharatiya Janata in India, the Islamic Salvation Front in Alge­
ria, the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and the various Islamic fundamentalist 
forces in Afghanistan.
b. Political Islam should be especially noted with concern. 
From Ayatollah Khomeini to Sheik Omar Abdel Rhaman, from Iran to World 
Trade Center, government leaders and opinion makers in the West and in 
the Middle East have warned of the dangers of militant Islam. If the 
1980s were dominated by image of embassies under siege, American hos­
tage, and hijackings, the 1990s bring prophecies of insurgent movements 
wielding nuclear weapons and employing urban terrorism. Headlines an­
nounce the possibilities of a worldwide Islamic uprising and a clash of 
civilizations in which Islam may overwhelm the West. Television viewers 
see bodies of Coptic Christian and tourists killed by Egyptian extrem­
ists and take in reports of Algerian militants, and pitched battles with 
police. All fuel alarmist concerns reflected in publication and confer­
ences with titles like "Roots of Muslim Rage," "Islam: Deadly Duel with 
Zealots," and "Awaiting God's Wrath: Islamic Fundamentalism and the 
West."
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The 1990s reveal the diversity and complexity of political Islam 
and point to a twenty-first century that will shake the assumption of 
many. While some Islamic organizations engage in terrorism seeking to 
topple governments, others spread their message through preaching and 
social services and demand the right to gain legitimate power with bal­
lots rather than bullets. However, their movement is directed toward 
changing the regional balance of power and driving outside interests 
from their region. Its aims are clearly international, going far beyond 
the issue of who governs Lebanon.
C. Finally, the world is confronted with an assortment of pro­
democracy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically 
in strikes or civil disorders and/or to provoke repressive violence by 
the authorities. All these movements reflect the tectonic increase in 
grass-roots activism decried earlier, and while they may experience 
setbacks in the short term they are not likely disappear any time soon. 
They include: popular drive for Western-style electoral democracy and 
human rights, that have been working themselves out in Burma, China, 
Haiti, the Philippines,' Thailand, and Zaire; struggles by disenchanted 
minorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments, 
from Northern Ireland to the former South Africa, and efforts by subject 
peoples to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule, as in East Timor, 
Kashmir, the Western Sahara, and the West Bank and Gaza. Paralleling 
these movements are the increasingly vigorous efforts of indigenous peo­
ple to reclaim rights and lands that have long been denied them by the 
dominant cultures. 12
C. Establishment (State) Terrorism
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1. Introduction
The use of terroristic violence and repression by states against 
their own citizens is a common phenomenon. In this century alone, tens 
of million people, living in most regions of the world, under communist, 
democratic, military, and theocratic governments have been and continue 
to be victims of state organized repression and violence. The proto­
typical episodes of state violence against its own citizens were those 
perpetrated by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes in the 1930s and 1940s.
The unprecedented evils of the Nazi Holocaust and the Great Soviet 
Purges have often been viewed as the special consequences of Nazism and 
Soviet Communism. Yet, with frequent recurrence of massive and violent 
state repression in other parts of world since the 1940s, there has been 
greater awareness that these horrors are not restricted to a narrow 
range of cultures or types of regime. It has become evident that the 
phenomenon has deeper, or more global roots and is tied to increasingly 
sophisticated and continuously expanding bureaucratic and technical ca­
pabilities of states everywhere for violence and repression. 13
Recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
seem to indicate a global trend toward the liberalization of society and 
the diminution of state organized terror. Politicians, journalists, and 
scholars, around the world, are already trumpeting the coming of a bet­
ter and more human world. A closer look, however, at the nations of 
world shows that the phenomenon of state organized terror is far from 
vanquished. Even as Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia liberalize, other 
states continue unabated in the repression of their own citizens. The 
salient case is China and that new symbol of state terror, Tianamen
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Square. Others that come to mind easily are the cases of South Africa, 
Iraq, Iran, Haiti, El Salvador, Burma, and Sri Lanka. These are but the 
most obvious cases that have been subjected to the glare of media atten­
tion. There are numerous others that are little known because of state 
control and secrecy, or because the violence has not been dramatic 
enough to draw media attention. North Korea, Guatemala, and Burundi are 
but a few of the examples that would fit into this category.
In spite of this increased awareness, there is little theoretical 
knowledge available about the nature and sources of state organized ter­
ror. Unfortunately, the severe scholarly neglect of the subject of 
violence and terror is just a part of neglect of more general subject of 
repression. Even when histories and political accounts of extremely re­
pressive regimes have been written, they usually have not analyzed the 
origins, the instruments, the politics, and the effects of terror it­
self. At least three fundamental factors are responsible for this lack 
of attention. First, information on violent internal repression is ex­
tremely scarce since most of the relevant documents have been intention­
ally destroyed or kept secret, while journalistic investigation has been 
severely restricted. To compound the problem, victims of violent terror 
often disappear or fear bearing witness to events. Second, outside in­
vestigation of the state's terroristic exercise of power over its own 
population has been viewed as interference with state sovereignty. Only 
recently has the protection of human and civil rights become a legiti­
mate issue of international concern. Third, predominant theoretical 
frameworks have failed to identify repressive state violence and terror 
as phenomena that are central to the modern state and which therefore 
require attention. 14
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Some serious attempts were made at the end of the 1960s toward ex­
tending the theoretical understanding of state organized terror by 
broadening the comparative frame work. Alexander Dallin and George 
Breslauer, in their book Political Terror in the Communist System, took 
the logical step of searching for parallels between China and the Soviet 
Block countries by looking at the relationship of terror to political 
and economical development. E.V. Walter, in his book Terror and Resis­
tance, attempted to provide a new perspective on totalitarian terror by 
examining terror in the Zulu empire of the nineteenth century. Virtu­
ally no one built on either these works until the 1980.
The most notable works are a volume on secret police in communist 
states by Jonathan Adelman, and three volumes on state violence and re­
pression edited by Michael Stohl and George Lopez, which aim to provide 
a framework for a broader comparative analysis and to define a relevant 
body of literature.
2. The Relationship of State to Society
The ideal relationship of state to society was articulated by such 
thinkers as Hobbes, Hegel, and Rousseau prior to the disasters of the 
twentieth century. It may be said that most of them saw the state as an 
institution that, like a gift from heaven, could bring peace to mankind, 
prevent people from mutual destruction, and introduce some measure of 
order into their lives. It was unthinkable to them that the state 
could, like ferocious beast, assail its own citizens, Rousseau contended 
that the subjects do not need to assume that the organism will want to 
damage its members.15
Much of this respect for the state was based on its performance of 
three essential functions: a) maintenance of internal peace and order,
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b) organization and protection of economic activity, and, c) defense of 
national independence and national interests.
Today, the state has lost some of its authority as the guardian of 
order and the protector of its own citizens. In the twentieth century, 
the state, like an unchained beast, has ferociously attacked that whose 
claim to be its master, its own citizens.
In most cases, people could not understand the cause of this rage 
or the desire to destroy those who seemingly were an important means of 
support for the state, and ultimately its very reason for existence.
The fruit of this perversion of the state has been the human rights 
movement whose theme has been liberation from the iron grip of the 
state and whose greatest fulfillment and validation has been the price 
set in motion by Gorbachev's glasnost.
The image of state as the defender of national integrity and inde­
pendence has also been seen as misleading in its neglect of the state's 
behavior in multi-ethnic and multi-national dominions. The states tend 
to be chauvinistic and jingoistic, often seeing in the persecution of 
minorities in the territory the best way to gain the support of the 
state in the twentieth century, and acted aggressively against the mem­
bers of minority ethnic group much more than it has come to their de­
fense. The states of Hitler and Stalin are just the most terrible exam­
ples of this general tendency. 16
3. The Characteristics of State Terrorism
Politics is the process whereby we deliberately set out to shape 
our communities of interaction. We do so by drawing upon the power 
resources at our disposal. One of these resources, whether we wish to 
recognize it or not, is the capacity to do harm, or coercive resources.
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Violence is a form of coercion, and terrorism is usually a type of vio­
lence. Physical coercion, or its threat, is commonly considered the re­
source of last resort, to be used only when other available resources 
have failed to shape community interaction. Basically, coercion in­
cludes all acts intended to harm others or their valued possessions.
Coercion permeates political life, from mild acts of parental dis­
cipline to devastating acts of war. Stable political communities estab­
lish and enforce limits on the use of coercion in social relations.
Acts of coercion that violate the limits within a particular community 
may be termed force. The notion of acceptable coercion or force 
implies a dominant consensus that the benefits of the coercive acts out­
weigh the harm done, as when the police use coercion to apprehend a 
criminal.
Acts of coercion in violation of these limits but intended to de­
fend the dominant order from a type of threat subversion may be termed 
establishment (state) violence. 17
Establishment violence, we must emphasize, need not be terrorist in 
nature, nor is it confined to public officials exceeding their authority 
(for example, police violation). Moreover, establishment terrorism 
needs not to be a form of violence, in that a regime could conceivably 
carry out a terrorist policy that conforms with the dominant definition 
of acceptable coercion. We need to make, therefore, some careful dis­
tinctions .
First, some analysts distinguish between oppression and depres­
sion. Oppression is essentially a condition of exploitation and depri­
vation (somewhat akin to the notion of "structural violence"), and
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repression is action against those who are seen to be threats to the es­
tablished order. Repression, then, may serve to maintain an oppressive 
system, but the oppression itself arises out of the realities of social 
existence for the people it oppresses. A land tenure system, for exam­
ple, may ensure the economical oppression of the majority peasants, who 
may require periodic repression when they demonstrate signs of unrest.
Repression may be within or in violation of the boundaries defining 
acceptable coercion, or force. In addition, strategies of repression 
may be undertaken by both private citizens and public officials. Some­
times private repression may stay within authorized limits, as when 
citizens "taken the law into their hands."
Some instances of both officials and private repression may be 
a form of violence but still not be terrorist. Terrorism depends on the 
nature of the target and the indiscriminateness of the means. If group 
of persons track down and knife the rapist of their friend, they may be 
vigilantes, but they are not terrorists. On the other hand, the random 
violence of the Ku Klux Lan against southern blacks certainly appears to 
be terrorism. Some but not all cases of privates vigilantism, there­
fore, may be terrorist. 10
4. Conditions Associated with the Emergence of State Organized 
Terror
What follows is proposed as a theoretical template for the phenome­
non of state organized terror. It has been constructed out of an analy­
sis of all papers presented at the International Conference entitled, 
"State Organized Terror," hosted by Michigan State University, November 
2-5,1988.
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Four general conditions seemed to be associated with the emergence 
of state organized terror. They are: a) distorted conception of the 
state and society and their interrelationship, b) the disarray of state 
institutions, c) the presence of deep economical and or/ ethnic con­
flicts in society or between the society and the state, and 4) state de­
pendence on foreign power. 19
The first fundamental condition associated with state organized 
terror is that terrorist regimes are typically animated by ideologies 
sharply at odds with reality and by unrealistic ambition for social and 
economical control. Communist regimes, such as those in the Soviet Un­
ion, China, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea, see society in term of class 
struggle and attempts to radically transform feudal and capitalist 
structures of land tenure and enterprise. One party, military-dominated 
regimes, on the other hand, tend to see the nations as an organism that 
must be dedicated to survival in the face of external aggressors whose 
agents are seen behind all independent political movements within the 
country. The National Security Doctr ine of the Argentine military in 
the 1970s and the concept of "total onslaught" guiding the South Afri­
can government until very recently are examples of this world view.
The second fundamental condition is great institutional chaos and 
disorganization, which breeds particularly intense political rivalries 
within state apparatus. Terror has grown out of such a context even in 
cases, such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, where the state has 
seemed monolithic and all powerful to its victims and external enemies. 
The chaos of state may exist because its various agencies have no 
clearly defined missions or means of carrying out their duties, or have
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overlapping responsibilities. The danger in such political chaos, par­
ticularly where the state is facing obvious and severe economical prob­
lems or military threat, is the emergence of political rhetoric empha­
sizing boundless will and energy and simplistic absolutes. Such rheto­
ric can take root and thrive because there are no established bureau­
cratic structures of decision making or political norms to support meas­
ured evaluation of polices.
Economical and ethnic division is the third general condition asso­
ciated with state organized terror. Economical growth has often been 
created from a large group of landless peasants and new industrial work­
ing class that has lost their economical security while commercial and 
political elites have grown wealthy. The resulting political volatility 
and motivated severe repression response has caused revolutions that 
have installed repressive regimes. Economical factors in state terror 
have been most salient in Latin America and are becoming more important 
in Africa with increased industrialization.
The violence of a state against its citizens is also often built 
upon to reinforce preexisting racial and ethnic conflicts. Ethnic con­
flicts, however, rarely lead to massive violence unless cultural and re­
ligious differences correspond to some degree with differences in eco­
nomical or political status. Often ethnic differences will be exagger­
ated by a regime, such as Hitler's, as a way of crystallizing a defini­
tion of the enemy, which will add the force of ethnic antagonism to 
their own political support. Where subjugated ethnic groups are cultur­
ally cohesive and engage in subversion or violence against dominant 
groups, as Kurds have in Iraq the way is clear for legitimization of 
mass political murder by the dominant group. This is the case in many
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Third World states that had not previously developed a common political 
culture or means of balancing interest.
The fourth condition associated with state organized terror in­
volves its international context. Repressive and terroristic regimes 
have often been regimes that have gained power with the military, finan­
cial, and political support of another, more powerful state. The clear­
est examples are the Eastern European nations and Afghanistan, but sev­
eral severely repressive regimes in Latin America and elsewhere have 
come to power as a result of US support. Such externally installed re­
gimes tend to violent repression for control. Many violent regimes in 
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, though not installed 
by external power, have built up their security and police forces with 
heavy foreign assistance. Such foreign aid has been aimed largely at 
maintaining secure conditions for production and trade by keeping vola­
tile opposition political activity in check, and at increasing influence 
to achieve geopolitical goals. 20
THE CASE IN THE POINT: Iraqi State Terrorism to the Kurdish Minority
A. The Historical and Socio-Political Background of Kurdish 
Problem in Iraq
Because of history and geography, the Kurdish question has been one 
of the thorniest problems of twentieth-century Iraq. A distinctive eth­
nic group of Indo-European origins and of Muslim, mainly Sunni faith, 
the Kurdish community comprises more than twenty percent of Iraq's popu­
lation (18 million), and resides in northern part of the country. In 
the wake of World War I, as a great power re-carved the Middle East 
following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Kurd was promised autonomy
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by the Treaty of Severe(1920), with an option for complete independence, 
only to realize three years later that they had been cheated out of this 
pledge: the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the victorious allies 
bore no specific reference to the Kurds, promising only tolerance for 
minorities.
Since then the Kurds have been one of the largest aggrieved na­
tional minorities in the Middle East, the intractability of their situa­
tion stemming from their dispersion in four Middle Eastern countries - - 
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria (there is also a small Kurdish minority in 
the Soviet Union) —  each having a vested interest in suppressing the 
Kurds' national aspiration. The Kurdish predicament has been further 
irritated by the fragmentation of the community along linguistic, clan 
and tribal lines, which has impaired the crystallization of a collective 
Kurdish identity and has facilitated their suppression by the respective 
governments. 21
In the Iraqi case, Kurdish separatism has been particularly discon­
certing for the central government. It threatens Iraq's fragile sectar­
ian edifice, thereby raising the fearful specter of the possible disin­
tegration of the entire state into three entities: Kurdish, Shiite, and 
Sunni. This, in turn, might have rendered Iraq a non-viable whole, 
given the fact that approximately two thirds of country's oil production 
and oil reserves come from a predominantly Kurdish area, and Kurdish 
fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary.
Because of these weighty considerations, the central government in
Baghdad had always been adamant on keeping Kurdistan an integral part of
»
Iraq. The Kurds, for their part, sheltered by rugged mountains terrain 
that made military operation in the area extremely difficult, embarked
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on a sustained struggle against the regime, which has continued with 
varied intensity to date. They asked for a proportional representation 
in Iraq's official institution, including the cabinet, the parliament 
and the army, and demanded a proportional share in the country's eco­
nomical resources. These demands were to no avail, as was their claim 
for autonomy in Kurdistan. 22
B. Early B'athi Regime's Terrorism to the Kurd
The Kurds waged continuous guerrilla warfare (1961-70) and open re­
bellion (1974-75) against the Iraqi government. When the first Ba'thi 
regime was established in February 1963, The Kurds quickly presented it 
with far a reaching plan for an autonomous region in Kurdistan. The 
plan was dismissed out of hand, and in the summer of 1963, the Ba'th 
launched a ferocious military campaign in Kurdistan. This proved a 
serious mistake that contributed to the collapse of the first Ba'thi 
regime.
Fighting in Kurdistan continued throughout the 1960s. Bath's re­
turn to power in 1968 and responded to mounting rebellion by rushing 
most of the Iraqi army (four out of six divisions) to northern Iraq. 
Fierce fighting ensued in which the military did not shy away from in­
discriminate attacks against helpless civilians. One of the better- 
known atrocities took place in the Kurdish state of Dankan in August 
1969, and was painstakingly recorded by the Kurdish Affairs Bulletin:
The children and the women of the village escaped to one of 
the caves in the vicinity, for fear of artillery shelling 
and bombing by air-craft. After burning the village, the 
officers and mercenaries assembled near the entry of the 
cave, collected wood, and after sprinkling the wood with petrol 
they set fire to it. The cries of the children and women begun 
rising to God. They were shooting at the entry of the cave so 
that no one could escape, and so were burnt, 67 children and 
and women in the cave. 23
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C. The Kurd's open rebellion against Iraqi government 
The events in Kurdistan were viewed by Saddam (then Vice Chairman of 
Bathi Party) with grave concern. He was mindful of the destabilizing im­
pact of the Kurdish problem on the previous Ba'thi regime and feared 
that an overriding preoccupation with it yet again would threaten the 
Ba'this' rule and, what is more important, undermine his position within 
the party.
He knew that suppression of an all-out Kurdish rebellion would re­
quire a sustained military effort. Particularly considering massive 
Iranian support likely to be given to the Kurdish rebels. It was clear 
that the economical cost of such a civil war would be exorbitant, espe­
cially if the Kurds were to handicap Iraq's oil industry. Also he was 
fully aware that Iraq's immersion in Kurdistan would play into Iran's 
hand and would enable them to impose their will on Iraq on a variety of 
issues, most notably the navigation rules in the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq's 
sole access to the Gulf. Saddam sought a peaceful resolution to the 
Kurdish problem.
In Autumn 1969 Hussein enter into secret negotiations with Kurdish 
leader, Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani and on March 11,1970, his efforts 
culminated in a Fifteen Point Agreement which contained far-reaching 
concession to the Kurds, most importantly, the first Iraqi recognition 
of the Kurds as a distinct national entity and their consequent right to 
autonomy. Other concessions included a recognition of cultural, lin­
guistic and administrative rights, the appointment of a Kurd as Vice 
President of Iraq and the enhancement of Kurdish representation within 
the state's ruling institutions. 24
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Had he adhered to the spirit of the March 1970 Manifesto, which he 
had personally engineered, and implemented into the letter, the Kurdish 
re- volt might have been averted. As things developed, Saddam overesti­
mated his ability to impose his own solution on the Kurds and was conse­
quently forced to fight simultaneously on two fronts, the Kurds and Ira­
nian Shah.
Barzani demanded that main bulk of the Iraqi army be withdrawn from 
Kurdistan according to the agreement, but Saddam refused it. Barzani 
chose a close associate of his, Muhammed Habib Karim, secretary-general 
of the KDP, as the Kurdish candidate for the position of vice President, 
but Baghdad did not accept this choice, Barzani also accused Saddam of 
"Arabizing" Kurdistan (in September 1971, some 40,000 Shi'ite Kurds were 
expelled to Iran on grounds that they were not Iraqi), and in 1972 
alone, tens of thousands Kurds of Iranian origin were forced out of Iraq 
to make rooms for the growing numbers of Iraqi Arabs arriving in the 
area. On September 29,1971, Barzani himself narrowly escaped an attempt 
on his life. He interpreted the attempt on his life as a defacto decla­
ration of war by Hussein.
Saddam nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1872, a 
consortium owned by several Western countries, which accounted for the 
entire oil production of Iraq and effectively controlled prices and quo­
tas. This oil nationalization was particularly galling for Barzani who 
viewed this move as a blatant violation of the manifesto, aimed at dis­
inheriting the Kurds of their right to the oil rich area of Kirkuk.
On April 9, 1972, Iraq and Soviet Russia, signed a bilateral treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation. This was the second treaty of its kind
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signed by the Soviet Union with a Middle Eastern country in the post 
World War II era after Egypt in 1971. Indeed, in theses two important 
respects the Soviet Union alliance failed to live up to Hussein's expec­
tations. While offering its good offices to mediate between Baghdad and 
Kurds, and between Iran and Iraq, Moscow was unable to bring about a po­
litical solution. Alarmed by the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi rela­
tions, the United States and Iran stepped up their support for the Kurd­
ish insurgency. This, in return, made Barzani more defiant than ever.
He dismissed Saddam's offer to join the National Patriotic Front, ac­
cused the government of consistent evasion of its commitments in the 
March Manifesto, and resumed the guerrilla warfare against the Iraqi 
forces in Kurdistant .2S
The Iraqi campaigning was initially successful, but by the fall of 
1974 it had already ground to a halt. Having failed to sever the Kurd­
ish supply lines with Iran (and Syria that also extended material help 
to Kurds), the Iraqi army was confronted by Bazaar's well-equipped guer­
rillas, armed with heavy artillery and surface-to-air missiles. The 
Iraqi predicament was decisively compounded when the Iranian army en­
tered the fighting on the side of Kurds, going as far as to deploy two 
regiments inside Iraq in January 1975. The exorbitant cost of the re­
bellion -- over $4 billion according to some estimates -- threatened to 
bring the country to the brink of economical disaster. As Sadamm was to 
admit candidly several years later, the human toll exacted by the Kurd­
ish campaign in the year between March 1974 and March 1975 exceeded
60,000 casualties.
With the Iraqi army on the verge of collapse and the economy se­
verely afflicted, the Iranian Shah was virtually holding Baghdad by its
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throat. At will, he could dismember Iraq; at will he could topple the 
Ba'thi regime. Fortunately for Saddam and his associates, all the Shah 
wanted was an unequivocal Iraqi recognition of Iran's geopolitical he­
gemony in the Gulf that concretely, required the legal revision of the 
navigation rule in Shatt-al-Arab and some minor territorial concession. 
Moreover, while using the Kurds as a pawn in imposing his will on Iraq, 
the Shah had no intention of allowing the Kurds to gain excessive power. 
Since Iran was burdened with its own Kurdish problem, an autonomous, let 
alone independent, Kurdistan would inevitably bode ill.
On March 6, 1975, Hussein and the Shah concluded the Algiers agree­
ment that, at one stroke, terminated armed confrontation between two 
countries, settled the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, and paved the way for the 
suppression of the Kurdish rebellion. In concluding the Agreement, 
Saddam's mind was occupied by an immediate resolution of the Kurdish 
problem on his own terms, which was a matter of life and death. Had he 
not reached such a solution, his entire future would have been jeopard­
ized; had he not bowed to the superior Iranian power, such a solution 
would not have been feasible. Faced with the choice between a humiliat­
ing foreign policy concession and political demise, the way out a was 
self- evident. Saddam ofted for the former and achieved his objective: 
forty-eight hours after the signature of the Algiers Agreement, Iran had 
withdrawn its support for the Kurds, and within two weeks the Kurdish 
rebellion had been effectively suppressed. 26
The Kurdish minority again became the victim of international power 
politics. What is noteworthy here is the attitude of American govern­
ment: In May 1972, US President Richard Nixon approved a CIA plan to 
grant Barzani some $16 million over a three-year period. Barzani be­
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lieved that the United States, in the capacity as Iran’s foremost ally, 
could provide a safety valve that the Shah would not be able to remove 
at will. His assumption proved wrong. The United States did not lift a 
finger to prevent the Shah from betraying the Kurds. 27
D. Iraqi Genocidal Repression in the Iran-Iraq War
Iraqi Kurdish separatists later backed Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. 
Hussein found that the Kurdish threat during the early war years less 
ominous than previously anticipated. The tribal and linguistic fragmen­
tation of the Kurdish community and long standing enmity between its two 
resistance groups, Mas'ud Barzani's KDP, and Jalal Talabani's PUK, pre­
cluded a joint Kurdish strategy and enabled the regime to pit them 
against each other. It was only after Iran had launched its first major 
offensive into Kurdistan in the summer of 1983 that the Kurdish opposi­
tion became a real irritant to central regime. Yet even Hussein managed 
to keep the two Kurdish Organizations apart.
While the KDP was brutally repressed, with some 8000 members of the 
Barzan's clan imprisoned, the PUK was carefully courted through substan­
tial financial inducements and ambiguous political pledges. Before 
long, however, Talbani discovered that he had been double-crossed by 
Hussein who had no intention whatsoever of rehabilitating Kurdistan or 
promoting Kurdish autonomy at the expense of the central government. 
Frustrated and angry, he curtailed the dialogue with the authorities, 
buried his differences with Barzani and joined the KDP campaign against 
the regime. Thus,in early 1985, Hussein was confronted with full scale 
insurrection in Kurdistan. In a last-ditch effort to deflect the Kurd­
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ish insurgency, the Iraqi President offered a general amnesty "for all 
Iraqis who conducted activities hostile to their country." When the 
offer was spurned by the disillusioned Kurds, a ferocious campaign was 
launched against them. With the passage of time and the deterioration 
in Iraq's military position, this campaign assumed genocidal propor­
tions, when the Iraqi forces retaliated for what they viewed as treach­
erous Kurdish behavior. Not only were the 8,000 prisoner captured in 
1983 executed, along with hundreds of other members of the Kurdish oppo­
sition, but the government embarked again on a systematic effort to up­
root the rebellious population from its native environment. By the end 
of the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988, more than half of the vil­
lages and numerous towns in Kurdistan had been razed and their popula­
tion deported. Some half a million Kurds were placed either in easily 
controllable settlements in the vicinity of the main towns in Kurdistan, 
or in concentration camps in the south-western Iraqi dessert. 20
Commended by Hussein's paternal cousin, Ali Hassan ai-Majid, this 
punitive campaign witnessed the extensive use of chemical weapons, in­
cluding mustard gas, cynaide, and Tabun nerve agent against the unpro­
tected civilian population. The first attacks of this kind were re­
ported in May 1987, when some twenty villages were gassed in an attempt 
to deter the civilian population in Kurdistan from collaborating with 
the advancing Iranian forces. A month later several Kurdish villages in 
Iran were given the same "medicine," with some 100 people dead and 2,000 
injured. The most appalling attack took place in March 1988, when the 
specter of a major Iranian breakthrough in Kurdistan drove Hussein to 
employ gas on an unprecedented scale against the Kurdish town of Ha-
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labja. As the thick cloud of gas spread by the Iraqi plane evaporated 
into the clear sky, television crews were rushed into town by the Irani­
ans and the world discovered the full extent of this horrendous massa­
cre. Five thousand people —  men, women, children and babies —  were 
killed that day. Nearly 10,000 suffered injuries. 19
E. The Kurdish Revolt after the Gulf War
The Gulf war dramatically changed the opposition's fortune soon af­
ter its start. The allied coalition's mobilization against Saddam 
raised the hope among the opposition that it would no longer be ignored 
by the international community; dissident groups redoubled their efforts 
to reestablish a common anti-Saddam platform and began to court members 
of the coalition. In December 1990, almost all the members of the Iraqi 
opposition convened at a conference in Damascus and established a steer­
ing group, the Joint Action Committee, that condemned Saddam's dictator­
ship and called for his removal and free elections.
The Kurdish revolt erupted in both rural and urban area when Kurd­
ish civilians, including professional and intellectuals as well as tens 
of thousands of Fursan members (Kurdish irregulars), joined the Iraqi 
Kurdistan front(IKF), which was made up of smaller Kurdish groups, and 
the rival Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK). Massoud Barzani, the head of KDP, and Jalal Talabani, the 
leader of PUK, acted quickly to take control of the rebellion and en­
gaged their veteran guerrilla units in attacks against government 
forces. Within days, and for the first time in their history, the guer­
rillas took several major urban centers, including the oil center of 
Kirkuk. By mid-March the IKF had declared that 75 percent of Kurdistan
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was in rebel hands. The groups rapidly moved to restore essential serv­
ices and civil administration in the "liberated" areas.
After crushing the revolt in the south, Baghdad moved its forces to 
north and launched an offensive to retake all urban centers by April 1. 
Lacking experience in urban warfare and hoping to spare urban popula­
tion, the guerrillas fled into the mountains, but they found that they 
could not conduct war in rural areas because they had been depopulated 
and turned into free-fire zones.
The reason for the collapse is clear: the guerrillas were not as 
combat ready as the Iraqi forces. Talabani noted that he did not realize 
that the Republican Guards were still in good shape. Neither the IFK nor 
he and international community expected what happened as the revolt col­
lapsed: hundred of thousands of civilians began an exodus from northern 
Iraq, that at its height, encompassed more than 50 percent of the Kurd­
ish population. Thousands of people died because of cold weather or 
lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey. The exo­
dus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by government forces, 
including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, as they 
had been in 1988.
The refugee problem received enormous international media coverage, 
prompting a massive humanitarian effort to provide the refugees with 
food, medicine, and shelter. On April 5, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 688, which approved the establishment of "Safe Haven" 
in Iraqi north of the thirty-six parallels that were protected by coali­
tion military forces; Kurdish civilians were encouraged to return to 
that protected zone.
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Despite their commitment to overthrow Saddam, defeated Kurds had no 
choice but to negotiate. Bagdad balked at many of Kurds' demands: they 
adamantly refused to cede Kirkuk, arguing that the city did not have a 
Kurdish majority; it also had no intention of losing control over a sub­
stantial part of the country's oil. The Kurds were reluctant to sign an 
agreement, and there were reports of a growing rift between Barzani and 
Talabani. Barzani distrusted international guarantees and wished to 
conclude an agreement with Badgered, while Talabani supported the main 
stream opposition's belief that Kurdish autonomy and democracy in Iraq 
would develop if Saddam were overthrown. 30
F. The Safe Haven for the Kurd
As mentioned above, In mid-April 1991, the United States, Britain, 
France, and the Netherlands, acting on a plan first advanced by British 
Prime Minister John Major, created the safe haven north of the thirty- 
six parallel. With Operation Provide Comfort, coalition troops facili­
tated a massive Kurdish repatriation while squeezing out the Iraqi gov­
ernment' s authority. When the last coalition soldier left northern Iraq 
on July 15, 1991. the four to five million Iraqi Kurds controlled an 
area that comprised 80 percent of the predominantly Kurdish areas in 
Iraq. By the end of September, all Kurdish-dominated areas in Iraq ex­
cept the city of Kirkuk had come under local Kurdish control.
The Kurdish zone covers 36,000 square miles, running from the Tigris 
River in the west eastward to the border with Iran, and including the 
Cizre-Dohuk-Amadiya triangle that made up original the safe haven; it 
also extends along the Iranian border south to Halabja and west to 
Suleimania and Arbil.
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The Kurds maintain a Western-supported de facto government in the 
region, supported by some 100,000 armed Kurdish fighters. The zone re­
mains under the UN embargo of Iraq as well as an internal Iraqi block­
ade .
G. The Typology of Iraqi State Terrorism to The Kurdish Minority
1. The condition associated with Iraqi state terrorism to the Kurd­
ish minority could be classified mainly as ethnic conflicts in society. 
This condition is deeply related to the domestic economic stake and the 
regional struggle for hegemony among the peripheral countries: Iran, 
Turkey, Syria and Russia.
- As previously indicated, the Kurdish minority occupies more 
than twenty percent of Iraq's population, therefore, Kurdish separatism 
has been particularly disconcerting for the central government. It 
threatens Iraq's fragile sectarian edifice, raising the fearful specter 
of possible disintegration of the entire state into three entities: 
Kurdish, Shi'te, and Sunni.
- Economically two thirds of the country's oil production and 
oil reserves come from a predominantly Kurdistan's fertile lands make it 
Iraq's main granary. The Iraqi government was shocked when Barzani de­
clared in interview with the Washington Post in the summer of 1973, "The 
Kurdish territory is rich in petrol. We are lawful owners. If support 
were strong enough, we could control the Kirkuk field and give it to an 
American company to operate."
95
- The Kurd's total population is estimated at twenty-five mil­
lion (1992), of which most are in Turkey (52 percent), Iraq (18 per­
cent) , and Iran (24 percent) . 31
Because of this peculiar environment, the Kurds have been often used as 
a surrogate force in destabilizing others, in the struggle for hegemony 
in the region: for instance the Kurdish open rebellion with the support 
from the Shah of Iran in 1961-70 and Iraqi Kurdish support in the 
Iran-Iraqi War in 1980-1988.
- Because of this weighty consideration, central government in 
Baghdad had always been adamant about keeping Kurdistan an integral part 
of Iraq by whatever means available -- including state organized terror­
ism.
2. As mentioned above, Sederberge classify state terrorism into 
four models from an institutionalization point of view: vigilante, cov­
ert official, overt official, and genocide. What model Iraqi terrorism 
falls under is dependent upon specific individual situations.
It should be noted the Iraqi government does not always resort to 
the repressive measures in dealing with the Kurdish affairs. They often 
have employed domesticating efforts to assimilate the Kurd as well as 
divide-and-rule political technique, because suppression of all-out Kud- 
ish rebellion would require a sustained military effort, particularly in 
the light of the massive support from the neighboring countries like 
Iran; economic cost of such civil war, especially if the Kurds were to 
handicap Iraq's oil industry would be great. For example, on March 11, 
1970, the Iraqi government's domesticating efforts culminated in a 15 
point agreement, which contained far reaching concessions to the Kurds
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including recognition of Kurds as a distinctive national entirety and 
their right to autonomy. 32
- Vigilante and covert terrorism models are quite limited in 
the effectiveness in application to the Kurds because their homogeneous 
communities shattered in rugged mountainous area in northern Iraq and 
even full scale military operations had been very difficult to achieve 
their missions not to mention vigilante and covert terrorism activi­
ties. Of course Iraqi intelligence institutions have vigorously engaged 
in harassment and assassination of tribal leaders, but this rather re­
pressive action could not be considered state terrorism; terrorism, as 
defined earlier, depends upon the nature of the target and the discrimi­
nation of the means.
- The main characteristics of state terrorism by the Iraqi 
government, therefore, fall under overt terrorism models, in the face of 
open rebellions of Kurds, in many cases supported by a neighboring coun­
try. The Kurds most nationalist activity since 1946 was in Iraq. There 
Kurds waged continuous guerrilla warfare (1961-70), and open rebellion 
(1974-75), against the Iraqi government. This movement collapsed as 
mentioned before, unofficial Iranian support was withdrawn after a 1975 
Iran-Iraq War.
In 1988, the Iraqi government was accused of using chemical weapons 
against the Kurds. They again revolted after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 
Persian Gulf War. When rebellion failed, more than a million of them 
fled their homes. As the death toll among the Kurds mounted, US mili­
tary forces built a camps for them in northern Iraq. The administration 
of this camp was later assumed by the United Nations.
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I would like to introduce here two typical examples of the Iraqi govern­
ment's terrorism to the Kurds.
- In a last-ditch effort to deflect the Kurdish insurgency in 
1988, a ferocious campaign was launched. This campaign assumed genoci- 
dal proportions; not only were the 8,000 "prisoners" captured in 1983 
executed, along with hundreds of other members of the Kurdish opposi­
tion, but government embarked again on a systematic effort to uproot 
the rebellious population from its native environment. By the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988, more than half of the villages 
and numerous towns in Kurdistan were razed and their population de­
ported. Some half a million Kurds were placed in either easily con­
trollable settlements in the vicinity of the main towns in Kurdistan, or 
in concentration camps in the south-western Iraqi dessert.
This punitive campaign witnessed the extensive use of chemical 
weapons, including mustard gas, cyanide, and Tabun nerve against the un­
protected civilian population. The most appalling attack, as described 
earlier in detail, took place in March 1988. Five thousand people -- 
men, women, children and babies -- were killed in those days. Nearly
10,000 suffered injuries. 33
- Neither the Iraqi Kurdistan Front nor the international com­
munity expected what happened as the open revolt in March 1991 after 
Gulf War, crashed. Hundred of thousands of civilians began an exodus 
from northern Iraq that encompassed more than fifty percent of the Kurd­
ish populations. Thousand of people died because of cold weather or 
lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey. The exo­
dus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by the government
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forces, including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, 
as they had been in 1998. The refugee problem received enormous inter­
national media coverage, prompting a massive humanitarian effort to pro­
vide the refugees with food, medicines, and shelters. 34
3. The world media often reported that Iraqi state terrorism, espe­
cially gassing of the Kurdish populace in 1988 were of genocidal propor­
tion. We admit that Iraqi state terrorism in its savageness and in its 
enormous scale could be called "genocidal," but this terrorist policy 
still had some limits. It was not aimed to kill all the Kurdish popu­
lace, neither was it intended to liquidate the entire structure of Kurd­
ish existing institutions. Genocide, already examined earlier, should 
include: first, genocide represents a systematic effort over time to 
liquidate a national population, usually a minority; second, it func­
tions as a fundamental political policy to assure the conformity and 
participation by the citizenry. The Iraqi state terrorism has not been 
up to these points. So, we could still categorize it as overt terrorism 
but as a worst case. 35
H. Conclusion
Could the Kurdish Safe Haven protec ted by the allied coalition 
survive in the future free from Iraqi state terrorism? It is a diffi­
cult question in view of the following considerations. At least the 
"haven" will be put under harsh challenge by the Iraqi state.
First, basically speaking, the Kurdish community comprises more 
than twenty percent of Iraq's population. Kurdish separatism is particu­
larly discouraging for the central government. It threatens Iraq's 
fragile sectarian edifices —  leading to the possible disintegration of
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the entire state into three entities .-Kurdish, Shiite; and moreover, two 
thirds of the country's oil production comes from a predominantly Kurd­
ish area, and Kurdistant fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary. The 
Kurdish separation is a matter of life and death.
Second, the portrait of Saddam as an omnipotent ruler was shattered 
by his defeat in the war and by the intensity of the insurrections. 
Profound bitterness was expressed by many who felt that Saddam had badly 
miscalculated or blundered into a trap laid for him by the coalition. 
Yet, he is the symbol of Iraq's achievements; he brought Iraq into an 
era of military strength and scientific progress. The message is clear: 
only under Saddam can Iraq regain its former strength; and the main 
stream of people has shown their belief that if Saddam is overthrown the 
situation will not improve but, rather, deteriorate dramatically. 36
Third, according to the record of the UN inspection teams in mid­
summer 1991, the war had destroyed between 45 and 50 percent of a huge 
inventory, but Iraq still retained 2,400 tanks, 4,400 armored personnel 
carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, between 1,000 and 2,000 artil­
lery pieces, and 250 multiple rocket launchers. The army has been re­
structured; Iraq now has between 350,000 and 400,000 troops, of which 
the Republican Guard constitutes a substantial and growing element.
The army is a more professional force that would be more formidable if 
Iraq were allowed to rearm. Saddam is in tight control of the entire 
army and will never hesitate to use it for maintaining integrity of na­
tionhood the coercion side of the political process. 37
And last, the Kurd are helplessly divided among themselves by vari­
ous sections as already mentioned. Though they have a strong self- 
identity, the Kurds are not yet ethnically unified, separated as they
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are by language, custom, neo-feudal obligations and physical distance. 
The formation of a united front for achieving political purpose, as 
evidenced in their tumultuous history, has often ended in frustration. 
This vulnerable point has expediently been used by Iraqi authority in 
divide and rule, and sometimes also by neighboring countries, getting 
them involved in regional power games.
It is difficult to believe that either side in negotiations that 
followed the Kurdish uprising in March 1991 was doing more than buying 
time before the next round of fighting began. After all, that is not 
what happened to previous negotiations in 1958 to 1961, during the 
1960s, in 1970 to 1974, and in 1983 to 1984.
Saddam's objectives in starting the talks seem to have been to 
neutralize the Kurdish resistance movements, playing for time following 
his shattering defeat in the Gulf War, and dividing the Iraqi opposi­
tion.
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Terrorism can be reduced but not eradicated because however demo­
cratic society, however near to perfection the social institution, there 
will always be alienated and disaffected people, some of whom will be 
aggressive and more interested in violence than in freedom and tolerance 
-- the very source terrorism. The reaction to terrorists, can not be 
ignored because the fortunes of terrorism depend largely on the response 
it encounters both from the public and authorities. With the Cold War 
over and the superpowers no longer assuming responsibility for maintain­
ing peace and stability within their respective spheres of influence, a 
greater burden has naturally fallen on the responsible nations of world 
community to cope with terrorism through international cooperation 
through world organization including the United Nations.
But the stark reality of the international community is not so 
friendly to international cooperation to cope with terrorism. Although 
the international community appears to recognize the needs for coopera­
tion against terrorism, national interests have dominated the treatment 
of the issue and unanimity has been rhetorical rather than practicable. 
There can be no doubt that sensitivity to political implication of the 
issue of terrorism has limited international cooperation. The search 
for juridical solution in the United Nations has not been notably suc­
cessful. Many Western observers agree that realistically the United Na-
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tions is not the best forum for cooperation against terrorism. In fact, 
in the U.S. perspective, inability to agree on condemning terrorism has 
discredited the United Nations. Given the universal scope of UN trea­
ties, as well as the controversial nature of terrorism, it is not sur­
prising that international treaties are often ineffective because of un­
derstanding and reluctant implementation.
Also, we must concede that, despite the potential advantage of 
counter-terrorism, its usage remains controversial for at least three 
reasons. First, counter-terrorism is very difficult to execute, and 
even when done effectively it may cause the government to act in ways 
that the public may find morally and culturally unacceptable. Second, 
there is disagreement over whether a legal or military approach should 
be taken. Finally, counter terrorism is not the function of any one 
government agency, which creates a jurisdictional tangle that hinders 
the development of effective counter-terrorism policy. 1
In addition, the difficulty of engaging in counter-terrorism has at 
least some interactive aspects. First, terrorist groups are clandestine 
organization headquartered in unfriendly countries where, for instance, 
U.S. intelligence assets may be deficient in Syria and Iraq. This dif­
ficulty was evident in the American hostage problem in Lebanon: most of 
the difficulty was in finding the hostages. Second, there is the prob­
lem of initiative. Although counter-terrorism is intended to take the 
initiative away from the terrorist, the terrorist effectiveness comes 
from attacking at unexpected times in places impossible to target.
Third, there is related a problem of the idiosyncrasy of terrorist acts. 
Each terrorist act is very different in terms of anticipating when or if 
it will occur. Thus, anti-terrorist activities may prevent one terror­
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ist act but have no effect on another. A fourth, difficulty is that 
terrorists are often accorded government protection by the countries in 
which they operate. The counter-terrorist must overcome not only the 
terrorist but also the host government.
The fifth problem involves identifying the center of gravity of the 
terrorist organization -- who and what to attack. Successful terrorists 
seek to imbed themselves in the population so as to make their identifi­
cation more difficult as well as to make it harder for others to attack 
them without alienating the population. Sixth, many of the most effec­
tive counter-terrorist acts suffer from cultural offensiveness to most 
Americans. Effective action of anti-terrorism may cover a range of ac­
tions, up to and including the assassination of known terrorists. The 
US government is prohibited from abetting or committing assassinations, 
which is a reflection of American cultural value. 2
During the Cold War, the two superpowers defined the "red lines" of 
international behavior, signaling to other nation-states and political 
groupings what activities were off-limits because they threatened the 
interests of bi-polar contestants. Now, the Security Council, more than 
the East-West framework can be the forum in which those red line are 
drawn. If it chooses, the Security Council can define a structure for 
managing the use of force that would increase the clarity of its deci­
sion-making and the predictability of its actions. The various actors 
in today's civil war-like conflicts are unrestrained by a awareness of 
"red lines" and of whom will set or enforce them. Establishing limits 
will take time, but unless it is done, the alternative may be interna­
tional anarchy. Yet, there are other roles that this new era has
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brought upon the various UN institutions. The end of the Cold War has 
implicitly given the United Nations the monumental task of redefining 
the concept of enemy. The institution of the Secretary General may be 
the most appropriate to that task. It has to rally the world community 
against its new enemy -- intolerance -- and the Security Council has to 
draw the "red lines" of the emerging international system. Otherwise, 
member states produce leaders who can lead without an enemy. 3
Actually, following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has 
greatly expanded its peace making and peace keeping operations around 
the world. Between 1991 and 1992 the United nations established 13 new 
peace keeping operations - - exactly the number initiated by the world 
body in its entire previous 42 years of its existence. At the start of 
1993, UN peace keeping forces were serving in Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, 
El Salvador, Golan Heights, Kashimir, along the Kuait-Iraqi border, in 
Lebanon, Mozambique, the Sinai, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and 
Western Sahara; all told some 60,000 military and police personnel were 
involved in these operations, with the number expected to increase sub­
stantially in the future.
These operations have contributed to stability in many parts of the 
globe and given the United Nations enhanced international visibility and 
respectability. And while some of the operations have run into diffi­
culties, most observers agree that conditions in these areas would 
probably be much worse without the presence of the blue helmets.
Nevertheless, world leaders generally agree that the United Na­
tions' current capabilities and methods are inadequate for the wide 
range of conflicts and security challenges expected in years to come.
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The Security Council has called on Secretary General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali and his staff to suggest ways in which organizations and peacemak­
ing activities can be improved. Development and implementation of this 
suggestion is likely to be the organization's top priority in the mid- 
1990s. To inform the discussion of peacemaking, Boutros Ghali published 
An Agenda for Peace in June 1992. * In this document, the Secretary Gen­
eral identifies five key areas in need of improvement: preventive diplo­
macy, or the negotiated termination of conflicts; peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, or use of United Nations forces to monitor cease-fire and 
to prevent the reignition of hostilities; peace enforcement, or the use 
of force to prevent or resist aggression by a belligerent in violation 
of United Nation's resolutions; and post-conflict peace-building de­
signed to alleviate human suffering and thus eliminate conditions that 
might contribute to the renewal of fighting. Boutros-Ghali proposed a 
number of initiatives in each of these areas, and broke new ground by 
calling for the formation of a permanent peacekeeping force under UN 
control.
The development of new approaches to local and regional conflicts 
has also been the matter of great concern in the United States, which 
has been under great pressure to step in resolve certain ongoing crises 
(notably those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somali). While the Ameri­
can leaders would prefer to delegate all such activities to the United 
Nations, others, including both President George Bush and Bill Clinton, 
contend that the United States has an obligation to act in certain cases 
where no other option appears viable. Thus in December 1992, President 
Bush, with only six weeks left in his term, ordered United States forces
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to Somalia in order to restore order in a country torn by fictional war­
fare and to protect the delivery of relief supplies to starving Somalis. 
In announcing "Operation Restore Hope," the President indicated that the 
United States cannot assume such responsibility in every instance of re­
gional disorder, but that it must be prepared to act when the survival 
of many human beings is at stake and when no other entity is available 
to do the job. "I understand [that] the United States cannot right the 
world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be 
resolved without American involvement[and that] American action is often 
necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of na­
tions." These comments, and the dispatch of American troops to Somali, 
sparked a heated debate in the United States over where and under what 
circumstances United States forces should be employed in such operations 
abroad.
Whatever the outcome in the United States and at the United Nations 
on the use of force in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, it is 
apparent that the problem of preventing and controlling local, ethnic, 
and regional conflicts has become the premier world security concern of 
the post Cold War era. Because such conflicts are likely to proliferate 
in the years ahead, and because no single power or group is willing and 
able to guarantee global peace and stability, United States and world 
leaders will be forced to enhance existing peace-keeping instruments and 
to develop new techniques along the lines suggested by Secretary Gen­
eral Boutros-Ghali. How peaceful a world we inhabit in the twenty-first 
century will depend to a great extent on these endeavors.
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